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INTRODUCTION
In 2010, Philip Morris International filed a complaint against Uruguay 
alleging that certain regulations on cigarette packaging violated the bilateral
investment treaty (BIT) between Uruguay and the company’s home state of
Switzerland.1 In its request for arbitration, Philip Morris claimed that the
government’s anti-smoking legislation decreased the value of the company’s
investments in the country in violation of Uruguay’s obligation under the BIT
to provide fair and equitable treatment to Swiss investors.2 Among other things,
the legislation requires that eighty percent of the surface area of cigarette
† Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law; Associate
Professor of Law Designate, University of Maine School of Law. For helpful comments and discussions,
I am grateful to Trey Childress, Jack Coe, Christine Goodman, David Han, Barry McDonald, Eric
Nguyen, John Rappaport, Mark Scarberry, Esther Yoo, and participants in a faculty workshop at
Pepperdine University School of Law. I also wish to thank Megan Hernandez for excellent research
assistance and the editors of the Yale Journal of International Law for outstanding editorial assistance.
1. See FTR Holdings SA v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Request 
for Arbitration (Feb. 19, 2010) [hereinafter Philip Morris, Request for Arbitration].
2. Id. ¶ 77. 
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packaging be devoted to health warnings, and that the packaging include
“graphic images . . . to illustrate the adverse health effects of smoking.”3 The
arbitral tribunal in which the claim was filed recently determined that it had
jurisdiction over at least some of Philip Morris’s claims, and the arbitration is
now proceeding on the merits.4 
The case just described is representative of an increasingly common
problem confronting international investment arbitral tribunals. It involves a
“regulatory dispute” in which Philip Morris is challenging the validity of a
generally applicable regulation. In contrast to an earlier phase of international
investment law when disputes primarily concerned outright expropriations of
the property of foreign nationals,5 recent claims like Philip Morris’s
increasingly challenge conduct that is not necessarily an attempt by the host 
state to extract value from the foreign enterprise. Rather, such disputes involve
what may be genuine efforts by the government to promote the public welfare
through regulation, with an impact on foreign investors that is incidental to the
government’s objectives. Nonetheless, a claim like Philip Morris’s is at least a
viable one because the fair and equitable treatment obligation that exists in 
most BITs has been construed to require a degree of regulatory stability, and
does not require claimants to show bad faith or other wrongful state conduct.6 
Investment tribunals are thus faced with a seemingly intractable conflict 
between the rights of foreign investors and the prerogative of host states to 
regulate in the public interest. Their involvement in such sensitive disputes has
triggered concerns about the legitimacy of the entire system of investor-state
dispute settlement. Commentators question whether privately appointed foreign
arbitrators should have the power to rule on the validity of “public interest
regulations” enacted by “democratically elected governments.”7 States have
withdrawn from international investment treaties or threatened to do so, citing
process concerns in decisions to award large damages to foreign investors.8 
And such concerns are not felt by developing states alone. As capital
increasingly flows into as well as out of developed nations, these states are
likewise concerned about the impact of investor-state dispute settlement on
domestic policymaking and about whether the continued inclusion of such
provisions is appropriate.9 
3. Philip Morris Brands Sàrl v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7,
Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 5, 7 (July 2, 2013) [hereinafter Philip Morris, Decision on Jurisdiction].
4. See id. ¶ 236. Philip Morris has raised similar challenges to marketing regulations in other
countries. See, e.g., Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Austl., PCA Case No. 2012-12, Notice
of Arbitration (Nov. 21, 2011).
5. See Steven R. Ratner, Regulatory Takings in Institutional Context: Beyond the Fear of
Fragmented International Law, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 475, 475 (2008).
6. See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 147 (2d ed. 2012).
7. Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s Engagement of
the Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit?, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 775, 779
(2008).
8. See Oscar Lopez, Smart Move: Argentina To Leave the ICSID, 1 CORNELL INT’L L.J.
ONLINE 121, 122-25 (2013).
9. For example, Australia previously announced that it would no longer include investor-state 
dispute settlement in its investment treaties, though a new government has backtracked on that stance.
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The approach taken by investment tribunals to regulatory disputes had
been evolving even as these critiques were circulating. But the view that now
predominates among commentators, and that is gaining traction among
tribunals, is known as the “public law framework.” The basic premise of the
public law approach is that disputes like the one between Philip Morris and
Uruguay are analogous to lawsuits by individuals challenging state regulations
under domestic constitutional or administrative law.10 According to this view,
investment treaties, like domestic public law, contain certain limitations on
state power and permit individuals to challenge actions that exceed the state’s 
authority or violate individual rights. Thus, proponents of the public law
approach argue that regulatory disputes would best be resolved using tools
developed in domestic public law to address analogous conflicts between
individual rights and state sovereignty.
The public law approach has a superficial appeal, but the analogy
ultimately breaks down in the particulars. One proposed method of resolving 
regulatory disputes is the adoption of a proportionality test. Advocates of this
approach suggest that tribunals should weigh the state’s legitimate regulatory
interests on the one hand and the investor’s legitimate expectations on the other
to determine whether the enacted measure is proportional.11 The problem with
this proposal is that it is fundamentally indeterminate, requiring the tribunal to
weigh incommensurable values. As described in further detail below, there is
no way to balance such values without engaging in policy judgments, and while
we may be comfortable with affording domestic courts that authority, there are
reasons to think that international arbitrators lack the legitimacy and expertise
to perform that function. Indeed, even scholars who advocate proportionality in
domestic judicial review implicitly recognize that its use by foreign 
adjudicators not embedded in the relevant political community would not be 
12proper.
A second set of proposals for resolving regulatory disputes may be
grouped under the heading “deferential approaches.” These approaches would 
largely avoid the proportionality test’s indeterminacy problems by resolving
any close questions in the state’s favor. States would be afforded wide latitude 
to regulate as they see fit, subject only to review for concerns like irrationality
or arbitrariness as provided for in domestic public law.13 Even this approach,
See The Arbitration Game: Governments Are Souring on Treaties To Protect Foreign Investors, 
ECONOMIST, Oct. 11, 2014, http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21623756
-governments-are-souring-treaties-protect-foreign-investors-arbitration. In the course of negotiations 
over the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), there has been widespread popular
opposition, particularly within the European Union, to the proposed inclusion of investor-state dispute 
settlement. See Jan Kleinheisterkamp, Who Is Afraid of Investor-State Arbitration? Unpacking the
Riddle of ‘No Greater Rights’ in the TTIP, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, Nov. 18, 2014,
http://www.iisd.org/itn/2014/11/18/who-is-afraid-of-investor-state-arbitration-unpacking-the-riddle-of
-no-greater-rights-in-the-ttip.
10. See GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 4 (2007).
11. See, e.g., Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, ¶ 306 (UNCITRAL
Arb. Trib. Mar. 17, 2006) [hereinafter Saluka Investments], http://www.italaw.com/documents/Saluka-
PartialawardFinal.pdf.
12. See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
13. See Anna T. Katselas, Do Investment Treaties Prescribe a Deferential Standard of
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however, creates legitimacy concerns because tribunals would be required to 
exercise some policymaking authority in drawing the boundaries of permissible
action. Moreover, a deferential posture cannot be justified by analogy to
domestic public law. Those who attempt to do so overlook important ways in 
which the relationship between a host state and a foreign investor differs from
that between the state and its own nationals. In short, the primary tools that 
public law proponents have attempted to incorporate into the international
investment law context are unlikely to produce a principled jurisprudence and
threaten to exacerbate the “legitimacy crisis” already plaguing international 
investment tribunals.14 
There is a still more fundamental problem with the public law approach:
it too readily dispenses with the question of the contracting states’ intent. No
one disputes that the contracting states’ intent would govern if it could be 
clearly discerned. But most investment treaties do not define the vague phrase 
“fair and equitable treatment” or otherwise explain how it should apply to
disputes involving genuine efforts by the host state to regulate in the public
interest. In the absence of clear textual guidance, proponents of the public law
approach leap too quickly to tests like proportionality that are not designed to
approximate the states’ intent and indeed result in some degree of
policymaking by the tribunals themselves.15 
This Article suggests a different path. I argue that investment tribunals
should look to contract law and theory for new tools to address the challenge
posed by regulatory disputes. The basic analogy of treaty to contract is well
established. Like private actors who enter into a contract, states enter into
treaties to make credible, binding commitments and thereby facilitate
cooperation between or among themselves.16 In contract law, when the parties’ 
intent is not made clear in the text of the agreement, courts do not simply 
abandon the search and substitute their own judgment; they employ other tools
to approximate what the parties would have wanted.17 Surprisingly, although
Review?, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L. 87, 149 (2012).
14. Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing
Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1523 (2005).
Professor Franck’s description of the legitimacy crisis emphasizes the problem of inconsistent decisions
and the lack of any mechanism available to reconcile them. See id. at 1582-83. As described in the main 
text, other legitimacy concerns have been raised as well.
15. Professor Einer Elhauge describes a similar concern about how one model of judging
encourages courts to exercise independent discretion in statutory interpretation: “Under [this view],
judges are to act as honest agents for the legislature to the extent they can divine its meaning using 
traditional methods of legal interpretation. But once those methods give out, judges must instead shift to
becoming independent lawmakers, furthering the normative views . . . they themselves find most
attractive.” EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES 3 (2008). My argument resembles Elhauge’s
in structure: we both propose that there are other steps that judges or arbitrators can take to approximate
the principals’ intent even after the core methods of interpretation, like text and purpose, “give out.” Id.
16. See ROBERT E. SCOTT & PAUL B. STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN: CONTRACT
THEORY AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 59 (2006); see also ERIC A. POSNER &
ALAN O. SYKES, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (2012).
17. See Paul B. Stephan, Courts on Courts: Contracting for Engagement and Indifference in
International Judicial Encounters, 100 VA. L. REV. 17, 20 (2014) (“Modern contract theory posits that 
courts should and do fulfill their mandates by attempting to ascertain the instructors’ preferences and not
their own.”).
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international law scholars have borrowed other concepts from contract theory,18 
relatively little has been said about how the tools of contract interpretation
could be adapted to the treaty context.19 That is the task I attempt here.
Extending the basic analogy to the present context, I argue that tribunals
should pay greater attention to the intent of the contracting states in resolving
regulatory disputes. As I explain further below, most international investment
takes place under the terms of a BIT created by two contracting states to
facilitate long-term economic cooperation between them. That only two parties
are typically involved makes the analysis simpler than if the treaty had to be 
interpreted with reference to the intent of a larger group. In any event, the
precise question presented by a regulatory dispute is whether the host state’s
changes to its regulatory framework fall within the intended scope of a fair and
equitable treatment obligation that BITs generally fail to define. Drawing on
concepts and principles from contract law and theory, I show how tribunals
could fill this gap in the typical BIT in a way that respects the contracting
states’ intent. I explore three specific tools: a default rule approach and two
default standards derived from contract law’s analysis of changed 
circumstances.
The argument for a contractual approach is a functional one. I do not
claim that recourse to contract principles is required by treaty text or has
another basis in existing international law. I argue instead that a contractual
approach is functionally superior to the public law alternative because it would
enable tribunals to decide regulatory disputes based on legal principle rather
than policy judgments. Likewise, shifting the focus to the parties’ intent 
reduces the legitimacy concerns afflicting the public law approach because the 
tribunals would no longer be reviewing the substance of state regulations. By
focusing on what the contracting states themselves would likely have intended
fair and equitable treatment to encompass, investment tribunals could avoid 
independently assessing the validity of state action as a domestic court 
performing judicial review would. In sum, by engaging in more principled 
reasoning and issuing decisions from a stronger position of legitimacy,
tribunals would be better able to sustain a dispute settlement regime that is
increasingly under attack and thus to play their role in facilitating the long-term
economic cooperation that investment treaties seek to achieve.
A few caveats are in order before proceeding. First, the scope of this
Article is limited to good-faith exercises of regulatory authority by host states.
Existing doctrine already recognizes that bad faith and other types of wrongful
host state conduct are inconsistent with the fair and equitable treatment
guarantee, and my proposal is not intended to interfere with that.20 Second, it is
18. For example, Professors Robert Scott and Paul Stephan use contract theory to illuminate
the tradeoff in international law between formal and informal enforcement. See SCOTT & STEPHAN,
supra note 16, at 7. One scholar has applied contract theory to international investment law specifically, 
but her analysis seeks to explain the economic logic of state behavior rather than provide interpretive 
tools for tribunals. See Anne van Aaken, International Investment Law Between Commitment and
Flexibility: A Contract Theory Analysis, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 507, 508-09, 515 (2009).
19. For exceptions, see infra notes 118, 122, and 123 and accompanying text.
20. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 6, at 156-58; see also infra notes 52-53 and
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worth clarifying that while the contracting parties are the two states entering
into the BIT, most investment disputes are between a foreign investor and a
host state. If the BIT is the contract, the investors are intended third-party 
beneficiaries. This may create some wrinkles because the contract law tools I
discuss were not designed with third-party beneficiaries in mind, but I believe
the principles can be translated.
Finally, many regulatory disputes also involve claims of indirect or
“creeping” expropriations, which are the equivalent of regulatory takings in
U.S. law.21 I focus in this Article on fair and equitable treatment because it is
generally considered the most important standard in investment treaty
arbitration.22 Claims of indirect expropriations face a higher bar, and the fact
that more extreme conduct is generally required makes them less of a threat to
state sovereignty, relatively speaking.23 Moreover, some BITs prescribe more
detailed doctrinal tests for expropriations that may not leave room for tribunals
to import contract principles.24 Thus, while I do not rule out the possibility that
the proposals here could inform the analysis of indirect expropriation claims, I
bracket that question for present purposes to ensure a clearer and more focused 
discussion of fair and equitable treatment.25 
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I begins with a brief overview of
international investment law. Part II explains the general theory of the public
law approach, which advocates greater sensitivity to the regulatory concerns of
states acting in their sovereign capacities. It then describes some specific
doctrinal solutions that have been proposed and presents my critique of these
proposals as difficult to administer and likely to exacerbate existing concerns
about the legitimacy of tribunals. Part III makes the general case for a 
contractual approach that would improve on the deficiencies of the public law
approach by bringing the contracting states’ intent back to the foreground. It
then explores three tools developed in contract law to approximate the parties’
intent in the face of a contractual gap and shows how they could be usefully
accompanying text.
21. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 6, at 101-04.
22. See Katselas, supra note 13, at 108 (similarly focusing on fair and equitable treatment 
because “it is raised in most disputes and is the basis for most successful claims”).
23. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 6, at 102-03.
24. The United States Model BIT, for example, prescribes “a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry 
that considers, among other factors: (i) the economic impact of the government action . . . ; (ii) the 
extent to which the government action interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-backed 
expectations; and (iii) the character of the government action.” 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Annex B(4), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf
(last visited Apr. 16, 2015). This framework, of course, is identical to the test for regulatory takings
established in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). The test 
has now been incorporated into other countries’ model BITs and investment treaties to which the United 
States is not a party. See Anthony B. Sanders, Of All Things Made in America Why Are We Exporting 
the Penn Central Test?, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 339, 344 (2010).
25. Relatedly, some foreign investors also bring breach of contract claims based on
agreements they have directly with the host state. See generally Sam Foster Halabi, Efficient
Contracting Between Foreign Investors and Host States: Evidence from Stabilization Clauses, 31 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 261 (2011). I bracket those types of claims as well because any relevant contract law
principles can be applied more directly and do not require the translation I attempt here to the treaty
context.
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adapted to the present context.
I. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW OVERVIEW
This Part provides a brief primer on the modern international investment
law regime. Others have provided more comprehensive histories of the
development of this regime, and I do not want to repeat too much of that here.26 
My account will spend more time on details that are relevant to the specific
investor-state regulatory disputes that are the focus of this Article.
International investment law developed to promote economic exchange
between states by reducing the risks of investing in foreign countries,
particularly those with relatively immature legal systems. Firms were reluctant
to invest in such states because they knew that these states had an incentive to
change the rules and thereby extract greater value for themselves after the 
investor had committed resources and otherwise sunk costs into the project.27 In
the early days of international investment, firms were primarily concerned
about outright expropriations, meaning that the host state would simply take 
property for its own use.28 Over time, investors also sought compensation when
the state did not directly expropriate property, but instead indirectly diminished
the value of an investment through changes to the regulatory framework.29 
As domestic law was not thought to be adequate to protect against such 
interference,30 international investment law emerged as a response to these
concerns. The difficulty lay in balancing the competing interests of states that
wished to export capital under the most investor-friendly conditions and states
that wished to import capital in a way that maximized their growth prospects. 
Because investment flowed primarily from developed to developing states, the
former pushed for strong investment protections, including a standard for
compensation that required states to pay “prompt, adequate, and effective”
compensation for any expropriations.31 Over time, developing states pushed
back on the views of developed nations, creating uncertainty about the content
of customary international law.32 This led to a period in which several
movements to create a multilateral treaty governing international investment
and thereby resolve the uncertainties were attempted without success.33 
26. See, e.g., Franck, supra note 14, at 1524-45 (describing the evolution of the BIT regime
and the mechanics of the investment arbitration process); Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors
and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45, 49-75 (2013) (providing 
an overview of the various intellectual perspectives that shaped and continue to influence the regime).
27. See Halabi, supra note 25, at 268.
28. See Ratner, supra note 5, at 475.
29. Id.
30. See Choudhury, supra note 7, at 781 (noting that “investors rarely found success litigating
against the host state in its own courts”).
31. This is known as the Hull Rule, named after Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who asserted 
this standard during a dispute between the United States and Mexico over the latter’s confiscation of
various American-owned properties in the early twentieth century. See Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs
Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J.
INT’L L. 639, 645 (1998).
32. See id. at 646-51.
33. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 6, at 8-11.
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While these efforts were ongoing, states turned to bilateral negotiations to
establish rules to govern international investment. The movement began in
1959, led by European nations like Germany, Switzerland, and France.34 The
United States followed suit in 1982 and to date has concluded approximately
forty BITs.35 There are an estimated 3,000 BITs currently in operation.36 
Developing states now establish BITs with each other, and it is no longer
unusual for investment to flow from developing to developed nations.37 
Although no major multilateral agreement has been concluded, a number of
regional agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), include provisions that are largely similar to those contained in
BITs.38 
The empirical evidence on whether BITs have been successful is mixed.
There is support for the conclusion that the presence of a BIT attracts foreign
investment,39 although some doubts have been raised even on that score.40 But
of course increasing investment flows is only part of the goal. The larger
concern is whether the developing countries that aggressively compete for
foreign investment are actually seeing any benefits in terms of their own
growth. On this question there is greater cause for skepticism, as evidence
suggests that foreign investment comes to developing countries on such
unfavorable terms that they end up extracting minimal benefit from the
arrangement.41 At the same time that the economic value of BITs is being 
questioned, BITs are having a substantial political impact in the form of
constraints on state sovereignty, leading some to wonder whether the “grand
bargain” is worth maintaining.42 
Notwithstanding the above concerns, what cannot be doubted is the
global importance that BITs have attained. In the absence of a multilateral
treaty, most international investment takes place under the terms of a BIT.43 
34. Id. at 6-7.
35. United States Bilateral Investment Treaties, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov
/e/eb/ifd/bit/117402.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2015).
36. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 6, at 13.
37. See Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual
Role of States, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 179, 196 (2010).
38. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 6, at 15. Likewise, the Energy Charter Treaty, which
promotes international cooperation in the energy sector, includes provisions addressing international
investment, and arbitral decisions made under that treaty are sometimes cited as persuasive authority in
cases brought under BITs. See id.; STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 311-12 (2009).
39. See Lisa E. Sachs & Karl P. Sauvant, BITs, DTTs, and FDI Flows: An Overview, in THE
EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT xxvii, liii-lvii (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs
eds., 2009) (summarizing these studies).
40. See Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract FDI? Only a Bit 
. . . And They Could Bite, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note 39, 
at 349, 368.
41. See Joshua Boone, How Developing Countries Can Adapt Current Bilateral Investment
Treaties To Provide Benefits to Their Domestic Economies, 1 GLOB. BUS. L. REV. 187, 191-92 (2011).
42. See Hallward-Driemeier, supra note 40, at 374-75. The term “grand bargain” comes from
Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral
Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67, 77 (2005).
43. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 6, at 13 (noting that “BITs are the most important 
source of contemporary international investment law”).
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Moreover, it makes sense to study BITs as a distinctive regime because the
major provisions across the thousands of BITs that have been concluded are
“remarkably similar.”44 The drive toward cohesion is further reinforced when
investment tribunals choose to cite each other’s decisions as persuasive
authority, including when they interpret similar provisions in different BITs.45 
All of this has led some to observe that international investment is now 
governed by what is a de facto multilateral regime.46 
The typical BIT includes provisions on the substantive standards for
investment protection as well as on dispute settlement procedures. The
substantive provisions address issues such as the admission of investment into
the host state, compensation requirements for expropriations, guarantees of full
protection and security, and guarantees against arbitrary and discriminatory
treatment.47 With regard to dispute resolution, most BITs contain advance
consent to arbitration by each state for disputes that investors of the other state
may initiate.48 The most popular arbitral forum is the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), which was established in 1966 and
has now adjudicated over 300 investor-state disputes.49 The cumulative effect
of these provisions is a robust set of protections for foreign investors and the
assurance of a neutral arbiter for any disputes they may have with the host
state.
Most relevant for present purposes, the typical BIT includes a provision
requiring “fair and equitable treatment” of investors from the other contracting
state. The term originated in early U.S. treaties on friendship, commerce, and
navigation.50 The various drafts of failed multilateral agreements included the
term, and it appears in NAFTA as well as the majority of BITs.51 There is some
variation in precisely where the term appears or in the language that surrounds
it, but it is generally understood to serve as a catchall provision for wrongful 
state conduct and thus is purposely open-ended.52 The standard has in fact been
used to address a broad range of concerns, including the denial of due process,
coercion and harassment, and failures to implement or enforce national laws.53 
Some commentators and a handful of tribunals take the view that fair and
equitable treatment is not a distinct treaty-based standard, but instead is meant
44. Franck, supra note 14, at 1529.
45. See SCHILL, supra note 38, at 322-23, 326.
46. See id. at 15-16 (“BITs in their entirety, it is argued, function analogously to a truly 
multilateral system as they establish rather uniform general principles that order the relations between
foreign investors and host States in a relatively uniform manner independently of the sources and targets 
of specific transborder investment flows.”).
47. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 6, at 13.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 239, 241; List of Concluded Cases, ICSID, http://icsid.worldbank.org/apps
/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/AdvancedSearch.aspx?cs=CD28 (last visited Apr. 16, 2015).
50. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 6, at 131.
51. Id. at 131-32.
52. Ioana Knoll-Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard and Human Rights
Norms, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 310, 311-16, 318 
(Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 2009); see also DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 6, at 132.
53. Knoll-Tudor, supra note 52, at 322-35.
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to incorporate the customary international law concept of an “international 
minimum standard.”54 Such an approach would prohibit outright takings and
other bad-faith behavior, but would likely not extend to good-faith regulations
in the public interest that affected foreign investment only incidentally.55 Most
tribunals, however, have concluded that fair and equitable treatment is an
independent standard that goes beyond the international minimum and requires
some degree of stability in the legal and regulatory framework governing the
investment.56 
The importance of stability is reflected in a commonly cited definition of
the standard’s general contours, formulated by the ICSID tribunal in Tecmed v.
Mexico57:
The foreign investor expects the host State to act in a consistent manner, free from
ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, so that
it may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will govern its 
investments, as well as the goals of the relevant policies and administrative
practices or directives, to be able to plan its investment and comply with such 
regulations.58 
Other tribunals have used phrases like “the stability of the legal and
business framework.”59 Sometimes the concept of stability is mentioned in the
BIT itself, but tribunals have incorporated the principle even in the absence of
such reference.60 
It bears emphasizing that, while evidence of bad faith may be sufficient to
trigger host state liability, it is not a necessary condition. Yet it cannot be the
case that every departure from regulatory stability gives rise to potential
54. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 6, at 134. As Dolzer and Schreuer note, this position is
difficult to defend as a textual matter. Id. However, the three NAFTA parties decided to adopt this
atextual understanding in an interpretive note after several tribunals had held otherwise. See Patrick
Dumberry, Moving the Goal Post!: How Some NAFTA Tribunals Have Challenged the FTC Note of
Interpretation on the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard Under NAFTA Article 1105, 8 WORLD 
ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 251, 251-52 (2014). The United States then extended this approach to its BIT
program by explicitly limiting fair and equitable treatment to the international minimum standard in 
recent BITs. See 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, art. 5, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2015). But these
attempts to limit the meaning of fair and equitable treatment have not settled the matter even for
NAFTA and the recent U.S. BITs. Some tribunals have concluded that the customary international law
minimum standard has evolved, and at least one has concluded that the standard has evolved to the point
of being equivalent to the distinct treaty-based principle. See Dumberry, supra, at 271-72.
55. See Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Award, ¶ 22 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. June 8,
2009), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0378.pdf (describing the traditional
international minimum standard as requiring an act that is “sufficiently egregious and shocking—a gross 
denial of justice, manifest arbitrariness, blatant unfairness, a complete lack of due process, evident
discrimination, or a manifest lack of reasons”).
56. See Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan Schill, Investor-State Arbitration as Governance: Fair
and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality, and the Emerging Global Administrative Law, in 50 YEARS 
OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION: ICAA CONGRESS SERIES NO. 14, at 5, 16 (Albert Jan van den Berg 
ed., 2009) (“International investment treaty tribunals have repeatedly associated fair and equitable
treatment with stability, predictability, and consistency of the host State’s legal framework.”).
57. Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mex. States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award (May 29, 2003) [hereinafter Tecmed].
58. Id. ¶ 154.
59. LG&E Energy Corp. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability,
¶ 125 (Oct. 3, 2006).
60. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 6, at 147-48.
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liability. Those points underscore the central dilemma posed by regulatory
disputes and the question on which this Article is focused: when should a
generally applicable regulation enacted to promote the public interest constitute
a violation of the fair and equitable treatment guarantee? Before explaining
how I would approach that question in Part III, I turn in the next Part to
consider other solutions that have been tried or proposed.
II. THE PUBLIC LAW APPROACH
The increasingly accepted view on how tribunals should resolve
regulatory disputes that pit investor rights against state sovereignty is known as
the public law approach. This Part begins by describing the investor rights
approach that prevailed in the early days of international investment law before 
explaining the general theory underlying the public law approach. It then
details two attempts to implement that general theory—the proportionality test 
and a set of approaches that apply deferential review—and provides a critique 
of each one.
A. The Investor Rights Approach
Before delving into the public law approach, it will be useful to 
understand the investor rights approach that it is gradually replacing. The
investor rights approach sees the primary function of international investment 
law as protecting the fundamental rights of investors and analyzes disputed
issues through that lens.61 Its dominance in the early days of international
investment law likely reflected the influence of the lawyers involved who had
come from the world of international commercial arbitration and were less
attuned to the concerns of sovereign states.62 Moreover, proponents of the
approach generally believed strongly in the sanctity of property rights, viewing
them on par with other human rights,63 or else believed from a more
instrumental perspective that investment protection serves a vital economic 
development purpose.64 In any event, the general principle was that, similar to
other individual rights that can be asserted as trump cards against the state,
rights granted under investment treaties may often take precedence over state
interests.65 
Tribunals taking such an approach did not necessarily employ an
explicitly distinct doctrinal test. Rather, their pro-investor bent was evident in
the way they described their task and the purpose of the BIT as fundamentally
about investment protection above all else. For example, the tribunal in SGS v.
61. See VAN HARTEN, supra note 10, at 136.
62. See Roberts, supra note 26, at 77.
63. See Charles H. Brower II, NAFTA’s Investment Chapter: Initial Thoughts About Second-
Generation Rights, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 1533, 1546-48 (2003). Some tribunals in fact drew
analogies to human rights to support their broad understanding of investment protection. See VAN 
HARTEN, supra note 10, at 136 & n.65 (collecting examples).
64. See Donald Francis Donovan, Introduction to Articles – Dallas Workshop on Arbitrating
with Sovereigns, 18 ARB. INT’L 229, 229 (2002).
65. See VAN HARTEN, supra note 10, at 136-37.
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Philippines described the Philippines-Switzerland BIT as follows: “The BIT is
a treaty for the promotion and reciprocal protection of investments. According
to the preamble it is intended ‘to create and maintain favourable conditions for
investments by investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the
other.’”66 This view of the BIT’s overarching purpose would then influence the
process of interpretation, as when the tribunal in SGS determined that it was
“legitimate to resolve uncertainties . . . so as to favour the protection of covered
investments.”67 
Applying that perspective to the meaning of fair and equitable treatment,
the tribunal in Azurix v. Argentine Republic explained why this term should be 
understood broadly:
The standards of conduct agreed by the parties to a BIT presuppose a favorable
disposition towards foreign investment, in fact, a pro-active behavior of the State to
encourage and protect it. To encourage and protect investment is the purpose of the 
BIT. It would be incoherent with such purpose and the expectations created by such
a document to consider that a party to the BIT has breached the obligation of fair
and equitable treatment only when it has acted in bad faith or its conduct can be 
qualified as outrageous or egregious.68 
In finding that Argentina had violated its fair and equitable treatment
obligation, the tribunal conducted an abbreviated analysis. It is evident,
however, that substantial attention was paid to interference with investment,
while minimal concern was shown for the objectives that the host state was
seeking to fulfill.69 As noted earlier, an investor rights approach may not
involve a distinct doctrinal test. Instead, the practical consequence of the stance
taken in Azurix is often subtler, as when the tribunal in that case gave weight to
only one side’s concerns and largely overlooked any countervailing 
considerations.70 
The investor rights approach has been widely criticized, and the tribunals
appear to be moving away from it.71 The primary critique of the investor rights
approach is that it reflects an overly narrow conception of the purpose of
international investment law. As has been increasingly recognized by the
tribunals themselves, investment treaties are designed to facilitate economic
cooperation in a broader sense, and maximizing investment protection in every
66. SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/6, Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 116 (Jan. 24, 2004).
67. Id.
68. Azurix Corp. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶ 372 (July 14,
2006).
69. See id. ¶¶ 373-77.
70. A similar course was followed in Occidental Exploration & Production Co. v. Ecuador, 
LCIA Case No. U.N. 3467, Final Award (2004). In finding a violation of the fair and equitable treatment
obligation, the tribunal emphasized that the claimant had relied on certain tax policies in place at the
time of its investment, noted the importance of stability in the legal framework for business planning, 
and concluded that the changes made by Ecuador improperly frustrated the claimant’s expectations 
without discussing Ecuador’s asserted justifications. See id. ¶¶ 180-92; see also Roberts, supra note 37, 
at 215 & n.16 (citing this case to illustrate reasoning that was overly protective of investors).
71. Roberts, supra note 26, at 78 (“Approaches that focus attention on the state as a treaty
party and regulatory sovereign are ascending in value, while those that draw comparisons with private
law or that narrowly focus on the importance of investor protections are declining in value.”).
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instance at all costs would be shortsighted. The tribunal in Saluka Investments
v. Czech Republic explained it this way:
The protection of foreign investments is not the sole aim of the Treaty, but rather a
necessary element alongside the overall aim of encouraging foreign investment and 
extending and intensifying the parties’ economic relations. That in turn calls for a 
balanced approach to the interpretation of the Treaty’s substantive provisions for
the protection of investments, since an interpretation which exaggerates the
protection to be accorded to foreign investments may serve to dissuade host States
from admitting foreign investments and so undermine the overall aim of extending
and intensifying the parties’ mutual economic relations.72 
With tribunals and commentators alike largely agreeing that a more
balanced approach to investment protection was necessary, the search for a
more suitable paradigm was underway.
B. The General Theory
Critics of the investor rights approach believe that tribunals go astray by
failing to appreciate the significance of the fact that one side of the dispute is a
sovereign state acting in its regulatory capacity.73 In the past, when investment
disputes more typically involved expropriations or other conduct that directly 
targeted the investor, the parties could be treated as equals, with no special 
concern for the needs of the state.74 But the investment disputes confronting
tribunals increasingly involve challenges to generally applicable regulations
designed to promote the public interest and only indirectly affecting the value
of foreign investment.75 Such disputes need to be addressed not as “reciprocal
disputes between private parties” but instead as “regulatory disputes between 
individuals and the state.”76 
Recognizing the vertical nature of the relationship between the disputing
parties opens the door to a shift from private to public law principles. The
foundational premise of the latter view is that when a state exercises its police
powers to regulate in the public interest, such actions are generally within its
discretion as sovereign and subject to only limited constraints.77 In the domestic
context, those constraints come from administrative or constitutional law,
which may impose certain procedural requirements on the government or
protect against interference with certain fundamental individual rights. But the
state otherwise has broad authority to balance burdens and benefits across
society, so in policing those limits, courts must be careful not to substitute their
judgment for that of the political branches, which have greater competence and
72. Saluka Investments, supra note 11, ¶ 300.
73. See William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public Law
Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 283, 285 (2010).
74. See id. at 289 (quoting Cai Congyan, China-US BIT Negotiations and the Future of
Investment Treaty Regime: A Grand Bilateral Bargain with Multilateral Implications, 12 J. INT’L ECON.
L. 457, 477 (2009)).
75. See id.
76. VAN HARTEN, supra note 10, at 4.
77. See Choudhury, supra note 7, at 777.
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legitimacy to make policy in the public interest.78 
Proponents of the public law approach contend that a similar framework
should be applied to the international investment law context. Like
administrative and constitutional law on the domestic side, international
investment law imposes “restraints on a state’s exercise of powers vis-à-vis
private investors.”79 When investors invoke those limits to challenge a state’s
regulatory acts, investment tribunals should not treat the two parties as equals,
but instead must proceed with special care for the concerns of the state as
sovereign.80 Proponents of the public law approach have borrowed a number of
different tools from domestic sources to implement that general principle. I
consider two such efforts in the following two Sections.
C. Proportionality
Consistent with the public law perspective, the proportionality approach
rejects the primacy of investment protection and instead treats investor rights as
something to be balanced against other public policy concerns.81 It recognizes
that sovereign states must regulate in ways that negatively affect some
individuals or groups, and such regulations should not be deemed
impermissible unless the burdens imposed are disproportionate to the benefits
gained.
Proportionality falls within the more general category of balancing tests,
which are a commonly used tool in public law contexts. As Professors Alec 
Stone Sweet and Florian Grisel explain:
Proportionality is an analytical framework first developed by administrative and
constitutional courts in order to manage legal disputes of a particular structure, the
paradigmatic example of which concerns a pleaded tension between a right on the
one hand, and a constitutionally recognized public interest pursued by the State, on 
the other.82 
Investment tribunals borrowed the proportionality test more specifically
from the human rights context, and in particular from decisions by the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).83 The analogy was easiest to see
with human rights claims involving the deprivation of property. Citing the
84ECtHR’s formulation in James v. United Kingdom, the first investment 
tribunal to import proportionality did so to evaluate a claim of expropriation, 
78. See Roberts, supra note 26, at 67.
79. Stephan W. Schill, International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law—An
Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 3, 17 (Stephan W.
Schill ed., 2010).
80. See Roberts, supra note 26, at 67.
81. See id. at 66.
82. Alec Stone Sweet & Florian Grisel, Transnational Investment Arbitration: From
Delegation to Constitutionalization?, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND 
ARBITRATION, supra note 52, at 118, 131.
83. Tecmed, supra note 57, ¶ 122.
84. James v. U.K., App. No. 8793/79, ser. A, no. 98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1986). The court there
stated, “[n]ot only must a measure depriving a person of his property pursue, on the facts as well as in
principle, a legitimate aim ‘in the public interest,’ but there must also be a reasonable relationship of
proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realized.” Id. ¶ 50.
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stating “[t]here must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the
charge or weight imposed to the foreign investor and the aim sought to be
realized by any expropriatory measure.”85 
Later tribunals then further adapted that principle to the issue of fair and
equitable treatment. In Saluka Investments, the tribunal first emphasized the
sovereignty concerns at stake in a nod to the public law perspective:
No investor may reasonably request that the circumstances prevailing at the time the
investment is made remain totally unchanged. In order to determine whether
frustration of the foreign investor’s expectations was justified and reasonable, the
host State’s legitimate right subsequently to regulate domestic matters in the public
interest must be taken into consideration as well.86 
The tribunal then formulated its proportionality test as follows: “The
determination of a breach of Article 3.1 by the Czech Republic therefore
requires a weighing of the Claimant’s legitimate and reasonable expectations
on the one hand and the Respondent’s legitimate regulatory interests on the
other.”87 
Prominent commentators have endorsed the approach of the tribunal in 
Saluka Investments. For example, Professors Benedict Kingsbury and Stephan
Schill argue that a proportionality approach may be particularly attractive to
those who believe that international investment law unduly promotes
investment protection at the expense of other concerns, because it allows for a
broader range of considerations to be taken into account.88 They also argue that
a proportionality approach has the potential to discipline the reasoning of
tribunals and, by improving the quality of their decision-making, enhance their
legitimacy.89 Stone Sweet and Grisel similarly argue that the adoption of a
proportionality test “would inject a measure of analytic, or procedural,
determinacy to the balancing exercise.”90 
Yet it is precisely with regard to administrability and legitimacy that I
contend the proportionality approach falls short. To see why my assessment
differs from these others, it is important to bear in mind the baseline they are
using. Regarding administrability, Kingsbury and Schill argue that a
proportionality approach constitutes an improvement over “‘I-know-it-when-I-
see-it’-type of reasoning.”91 Thus, they conclude, “[a] proportionality analysis
certainly seems preferable as a rational process for balancing investment
protection and competing interests, by comparison with approaches in which an
extensive summary of the facts of the case at hand is followed by [an] abrupt
determination with little intelligible reasoning . . . .”92 
Analyzing facts within a proportionality framework is of course 
85. Tecmed, supra note 57, ¶ 122.
86. Saluka Investments, supra note 11, ¶ 305.
87. Id. ¶ 306.
88. Kingsbury & Schill, supra note 56, at 51-52.
89. See id.
90. Stone Sweet & Grisel, supra note 82, at 131.
91. Kingsbury & Schill, supra note 56, at 51.
92. Id.
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preferable to making abrupt conclusions without supporting reasoning. Such a
framework would at least point tribunals to the relevant considerations. But
once each side of the equation is determined, the proponents of proportionality 
provide no guidance regarding how interests that are so different in kind should 
be valued and weighed against each other. Indeed, while there may be extreme
cases of disproportionality on which the majority of decision-makers could
agree, the basic act of balancing is a fundamentally indeterminate exercise.93 
To illustrate the point, consider how a tribunal should evaluate Philip Morris’s
claim against Uruguay discussed above. It is difficult to see, from the 
standpoint of law, how the financial losses incurred by Philip Morris can be
meaningfully weighed against the public health benefits to be gained by
stronger health warnings.
It is true, of course, that domestic courts regularly engage in such
balancing in a variety of contexts to review the legality of government action.94 
But when they do, it is understood that such decisions are not purely legal but
involve at least a degree of policy judgment.95 As explained by one proponent
of proportionality, Professor Aharon Barak, the act of balancing “requires a
common denominator,” such as “the social importance of the conflicting
principles at the point of conflict.”96 Other proponents recognize the concern
about judicial policymaking, but believe the advantages of proportionality
outweigh the disadvantages.97 Barak further contends that this form of judicial
review is entirely consistent with a constitutional democracy and presents no
legitimacy concerns, at least when carried out by domestic courts.98 
93. See Alec Stone Sweet, Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality’s New Frontier, 4 L. &
ETHICS HUM. RTS. 47, 50 (2010). The incommensurability problem should not, of course, be overstated.
As one commentator puts it, “[t]he objection from incommensurability is significant, and yet there is no
denying that judgments made under the rubric of proportionality may reflect shared intuitions about
justice, and to that extent may seem unobjectionable.” Grant Huscroft, Proportionality and Pretense, 29
CONST. COMMENT. 229, 243-44 (2014) (reviewing AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY:
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS (2012)).
94. For example, courts evaluating statutes under the Equal Protection Clause balance the
individual’s right to be free from discrimination against the government’s interest in drawing the
distinction at issue, applying different tiers of scrutiny depending on the nature of the classification 
being drawn. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 9.1.2, at
685-86 (4th ed. 2011). Likewise, courts evaluating claims of Fourth Amendment violations balance the
individual’s right to privacy against the government’s interest in conducting the search at issue. See, e.g., 
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001) (“The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness, and the reasonableness of a search is determined ‘by assessing, on the one hand, the 
degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is
needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’” (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 
U.S. 295, 300 (1999))).
95. See, e.g., Molly S. McUsic, Looking Inside Out: Institutional Analysis and the Problem of
Takings, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 591, 660 (1998) (noting that the ad hoc balancing test applied in U.S. 
takings cases “obviously requires policy judgments”).
96. Aharon Barak, On Society, Law, and Judging, 47 TULSA L. REV. 297, 310 (2011).
97. See Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global
Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72, 87 (2008) (noting that “balancing can never be
dissociated from lawmaking: it requires judges to behave as legislators do, or to sit in judgment of a
prior act of balancing by elected officials”); see also Kingsbury & Schill, supra note 56, at 51-52 
(“Proportionality analysis . . . is open to the criticisms that it confers power on judges to take policy-
driven decisions about the proper balance between conflicting rights and interests.”).
98. BARAK, supra note 93, at 253.
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Advocates of judicial restraint may be uncomfortable with even domestic
judges exercising such lawmaking power, but for present purposes the more 
significant concern is that international arbitrators are particularly ill-equipped
to do so. First, the backgrounds of investment arbitrators are relatively
homogeneous and typically do not include any public law expertise.99 Second,
various limitations on arbitration procedures make the process less optimally 
structured than most courts (which are already less optimally structured than
legislatures) to receive the relevant inputs needed to make good decisions.100 
And third, foreign arbitrators lack the legitimacy to exercise policymaking
authority because they are (in part) privately appointed and not accountable to
the domestic public that their decisions affect.101 As one commentator put this
last point: “most troubling[] is that the system’s unique use of private
arbitration in the regulatory sphere conflicts with cherished principles of
judicial accountability and independence in democratic societies; in effect, it
taints the integrity of the legal system by contracting out the judicial function in
public law.”102 
All three of those problems can theoretically be fixed, or at least
mitigated, through reforms. But there is another dimension on which
international arbitrators will never have the relevant expertise to review state 
decisions or the legitimacy to exercise that power. As Professors William
Burke-White and Andreas von Staden explain, one reason we are comfortable
with domestic judges exercising some degree of lawmaking authority is that
they “are embedded within the social, political and legal environment within
which they operate.”103 That close connection is important because, as Barak
writes, a judge applying proportionality is required
. . . to look at the legal system as a whole. He has to consider the constitution and
the role the different principles play in it. He has to read the legal system’s history
and the jurispruden[ce] of the courts. The judge attempts to express the basic values 
of the society in which he lives.104 
99. See Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 73, at 330; Roberts, supra note 26, at 77; see 
also Choudhury, supra note 7, at 831 (noting that, in practice, “even where a tribunal weighs a public
interest against interference with an investment, the impact upon investment, rather than the gravity of
the public interest issue implicated, is the key consideration in determining whether an investment 
obligation has been violated”).
100. See Choudhury, supra note 7, at 785-89.
101. See id. at 818-21. While it is true that states, through treaties, make the initial delegation of
authority to international investment tribunals to decide disputes, that one-time act is seen as too thin to
create legitimacy given the length of the commitment and the absence of ongoing supervision. See
Kingsbury & Schill, supra note 56, at 54; see also VAN HARTEN, supra note 10, at 25 (noting that a
state’s general consent to investment arbitration potentially creates “a type of governing arrangement”
and “raises special concerns about the delegation of adjudicative authority to arbitrators who are 
insulated from domestic judicial review”).
102. See VAN HARTEN, supra note 10, at 4. There is also the question of the broader legitimacy 
of the system: because tribunals cite each other’s decisions as precedent, even when different treaties are
at issue, individual arbitrators who were formally appointed to decide only one dispute can have a much
broader impact on state and investor conduct around the world. See Kingsbury & Schill, supra note 56, 
at 6-7; see also Roberts, supra note 37, at 190-91 (arguing that tribunals are not accountable to the states
that are creating them because they rely on the precedent of other tribunals).
103. See Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 73, at 331.
104. See Barak, supra note 96, at 310.
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International arbitrators will likely never be sufficiently versed in the
needs and concerns of the individual states whose decisions they review to 
perform those tasks adequately. Given this lack of perspective, we should be
skeptical about allowing arbitrators to make sensitive policy determinations
that are likely to turn on context-specific judgments.105 In short, a more
administrable test that tribunals can apply legitimately is needed.
D. Deferential Approaches
For those who are otherwise sympathetic to the public law perspective,
the primary alternative to proportionality is a form of review that affords
greater deference to state decision-making. Proponents of a deferential
approach start from the same place—a recognition that sovereign states have 
discretion “to allocate burdens and benefits across society”106 through
regulation—but conclude that tests like proportionality allow tribunals to 
interfere too much with that discretion. They propose instead that a state’s
balancing determination be respected in the absence of some extreme
deficiency.
Commentators have suggested a variety of doctrinal tests to implement
that general principle. One suggests applying a standard similar to the
“arbitrary and capricious” standard under the Administrative Procedure Act.107 
Others propose borrowing the margin of appreciation doctrine applied by the
109ECtHR,108 and some tribunals have actually done so. Another tribunal,
echoing the language of U.S. courts applying rational basis review, emphasized
in an ICSID arbitration against Hungary that its “task here is not to sit
retrospectively in judgment upon Hungary’s discretionary exercise of a
sovereign power, not made irrationally and not exercised in bad faith toward
Dunamenti at the relevant time.”110 Absent such concerns, tribunals should
afford states considerable latitude to regulate as they see fit.
An initial critique of these deferential approaches is that they do not solve
the problem of legitimacy. To a certain extent, deferential approaches do
reduce administrability concerns because they allow tribunals to resolve any
close cases in favor of the state. But they nonetheless reserve some authority
for tribunals to find violations based on policy judgments. Applying a
deferential approach still requires tribunals to draw boundaries of permissible
action that are not based on any legal determination.111 Thus, while a
deferential approach reduces the policy discretion held by the reviewing 
105. See Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 73, at 336.
106. SANTIAGO MONTT, STATE LIABILITY IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 7 (2009).
107. See Katselas, supra note 13, at 91.
108. See Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 73, at 304-05.
109. See Julian Arato, The Margin of Appreciation in International Investment Law, 54 VA. J.
INT’L L. 545, 551 (2014).
110. Electralabel S.A. v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction,
Applicable Law and Liability, ¶ 8.35 (Nov. 30, 2012).
111. In a related critique, Professor Julian Arato shows how tribunals invoking the margin of
appreciation have in fact applied very different forms or levels of deference when doing so. See Arato,
supra note 109, at 564-65.
       
        
  
          
 
          
             
          
            
              
          
         
          
         
         
           
            
         
            
       
      
       
 
           
          
      
       
           
        
 
    
            
         
        
         
        
       
        
 
       
              
            
           
     
               
    
         
              
 
      
295_CHEN_CONTRACTUAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/15 1:57 PM
2015] A Contractual Approach to Investor-State Regulatory Disputes 313
tribunals, it does not change the essential nature of their task and so leaves
them vulnerable to the legitimacy critique.
Moreover, to the extent proponents of a deferential approach have
justified it by analogy to domestic public law, their argument rests on shaky
premises. In their view, the fair and equitable treatment guarantee is equivalent
to the obligation of democratic states to make decisions consistent with the rule
of law.112 But the more limited obligation of a democratic state to its own
nationals is based on the fact that the latter yield some of their autonomy in 
exchange for the state’s protection and other benefits of citizenship.113 Foreign
investors do not enter the state via the same implicit bargain. Instead, they enter
as beneficiaries of an agreement—the BIT—by which the host state has
voluntarily yielded some of its sovereignty.114 Thus, the discretion that host
states have to regulate to the detriment of foreign investors should arguably be
reduced. At the same time, foreigners may be in need of greater protection
because they cannot participate as directly in the election of officials and the
formulation of the policies they enact.115 In light of these differences in status
between the foreign investor and the state’s nationals, the limited protections
provided to the latter do not justify interpreting BITs to grant foreign investors
nothing more than “protections from abuses of governmental power.”116 
* * *
In sum, both the proportionality test and the deferential approach would
require some degree of policymaking and thus prevent tribunals from
producing principled judgments or otherwise improving on their legitimacy
concerns. And both approaches, like the public law framework generally,
ignore the possibility of further inquiry into the contracting states’ intent. The
next Part shows how a contractual approach would be an improvement in all 
these respects.
III. A CONTRACTUAL APPROACH
This Part begins by explaining why a contractual approach is superior to
existing solutions from a functional standpoint. By using open-ended terms like 
fair and equitable treatment in their BITs, states delegated authority to 
investment tribunals to develop the meaning of such standards through
application to specific cases. States have not instructed tribunals to use a 
contractual approach any more than they have mandated a public law
framework. The argument here is simply that tribunals should look to contract
112. See Katselas, supra note 13, at 91, 149.
113. See Anita L. Allen, Social Contract Theory in American Case Law, 51 FLA. L. REV. 1, 2
(1999) (“Social contract theories provide that rational individuals will agree by contract, compact or 
covenant to give up the condition of unregulated freedom in exchange for the security of a civil society 
governed by a just, binding rule of law.”).
114. See Kassi D. Tallent, The Tractor in the Jungle: Why Investment Arbitration Tribunals
Should Reject a Margin of Appreciation Doctrine, in 3 INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 111, 129-30 (Ian A. Laird & Todd J. Weiler eds., 2010).
115. See id. at 130 (noting that “the investor is an outsider to the democratic processes
influencing the development and application of state regulatory measures”).
116. Katselas, supra note 13, at 148 (emphasis omitted).
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law and theory because it offers tools that will assist them in developing a more
principled approach to regulatory disputes as well as in enhancing their
legitimacy.
After Section III.A lays out the functional argument, the remaining
Sections in this Part adapt specific tools from contract law and theory to show
how tribunals could better respect the contracting states’ intent. The first of
these, a default rule approach, approximates the parties’ intent by identifying
the term that most states would have adopted if they had considered the matter. 
A default rule approach has the particular advantage of providing clear,
advance notice of how tribunals will resolve disputes and thereby placing the
onus on states to revise the term if the default approach does not comport with 
their preferences.
The second and third principles both come from contract law’s attempt to
deal with the problem of changed circumstances. The two proposed 
approaches, a foreseeability test and efficient risk bearer analysis, are 
alternative ways that courts and scholars have identified to fill the gap when the 
contracting parties fail to address a particular supervening event. Instead of
providing the certain but inflexible answer that a default rule approach would,
the foreseeability and efficient risk bearer approaches serve as default standards
that allow adjudicators to take into account additional contextual facts in
attempting to resolve the dispute as the parties would have wanted.117 Although
the two tests sometimes point in different directions, both rest on plausible
assumptions about the unstated intentions of parties to a contract, and with
some tinkering both can provide a principled framework for resolving
regulatory disputes in a manner that plausibly approximates the contracting
states’ intent. The final Section in this Part explains how one might choose
among the three proposed tools and how the chosen solution could be 
implemented.
One potential objection worth addressing at the outset is the possibility
that states have implicitly endorsed the public law framework by continuing to
create BITs with an unqualified fair and equitable treatment standard. That
inference is not warranted for two reasons. First, although I have described a
gradually forming scholarly consensus around the public law framework, there
is sufficient variance in tribunal practice to preclude an inference that states are
implicitly endorsing any particular approach. Second, as discussed further
below, states have in fact expressed their dissatisfaction with the status quo by
revising more recent BITs in various ways. Thus, the available evidence
suggests that states are in fact looking for a better approach to fair and equitable
treatment. The proposals here, although primarily designed for tribunals to use
as gap-filling measures, are also available options for these dissatisfied states to
incorporate explicitly into their BITs.
117. Although the term “default rule” is often used to mean “default provision” without regard 
to how precisely the provision is tailored, the literature does recognize a distinction between default 
rules and default standards. For a discussion of the tradeoff between these two approaches, see generally
Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 
1 (1994).
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A. The Functional Argument
The basic proposition that treaties should be interpreted according to the
parties’ intent is uncontroversial.118 In any treaty regime, no one would dispute
that such intent, when reflected in clear text, should be respected.119 Likewise,
courts and tribunals are seeking to determine the parties’ intent when they
interpret a treaty’s terms “in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose,” as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties dictates.120 The
difficult question arises when interpretation by text and purpose do not resolve
the issue, and some other mechanism is needed to resolve the ambiguity. That
of course is the case here, as text and purpose do not resolve how the fair and 
equitable treatment guarantee should apply to regulatory disputes.
Contract theory has developed a number of tools to approximate the
parties’ intent in the face of ambiguity. Notably, although scholars have applied 
contract theory to other international law questions,121 relatively little has been
said about how its interpretive aids, beyond text and purpose, could be applied 
to construe treaties. One commentator has explored how certain interpretive
canons, such as the presumption against the drafting party, could be adapted to
the treaty context.122 Others have argued that the tools of a particular scholarly
perspective, known as relational contract theory, provide a useful resource for
common treaty interpretation problems.123 In the international investment law
context specifically, tribunals and commentators have not taken advantage of
contract law’s more sophisticated tools of interpretation.
To be precise, I should acknowledge that critics of the investor rights
approach have occasionally equated it to a private law or contract law
paradigm. For example, Burke-White and von Staden criticize tribunals for
“operat[ing] as if the only rights at stake were those of investors and as if [they] 
were enforcing narrowly drawn private law contracts divorced from public law 
118. A broader debate exists over whether treaties are more like statutes or contracts or should
be understood as sui generis. See Alex Glashausser, What We Must Never Forget When It Is a Treaty We
Are Expounding, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1243, 1267-68 (2005) (summarizing and citing examples of all
three perspectives). But even those who do not find the contract analogy to be the best fitting one would
not disagree with the limited proposition set forth above. See id. at 1299 (“[M]ost commentators agree 
that the touchstone of treaty interpretation is the intent of the parties.”). Nor would they likely disagree
that there is value in borrowing tools from a variety of sources, given the hybrid nature of treaties. See
id. at 1247-48 (“Treaties undeniably have much in common with statutes and contracts, and that
commonality is a useful starting point.”). My argument here is only that there is untapped promise in
further developing the contract analogy in this particular context, and not that it should trump all other
sources for treaty interpretation matters generally.
119. See, e.g., Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982) (“The clear
import of treaty language controls unless ‘application of the words of the treaty according to their
obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the intent or expectations of its signatories.’” (quoting 
Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 54 (1963))).
120. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
121. See supra note 18.
122. See Glashausser, supra note 118, at 1308-21.
123. See Curtis J. Mahoney, Note, Treaties as Contracts: Textualism, Contract Theory, and the
Interpretation of Treaties, 116 YALE L.J. 824, 846-56 (2007); Jared Wessel, Note, Relational Contract
Theory and Treaty Interpretation: End-Game Treaties v. Dynamic Obligations, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 149, 149-50 (2004).
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context.”124 For them, a private law approach means unduly favoring investor
rights while overlooking the sovereignty concerns at stake. Their critique
therefore does not bear on the contract analogy developed here, focusing on the
two states as the contracting parties rather than on the investor and host state as
the disputing parties.125 Furthermore, I do not disagree with the critique that 
such scholars have made of the investor rights approach and I am not
advocating a return to the narrow view of investment treaties that ignores
values other than investment protection. Instead, I am suggesting that contract
theory offers more resources for the present challenge—including tools that can
adequately protect state sovereignty—than has previously been recognized. 
These tools have not yet been examined in practice or in scholarly commentary.
As a further caveat, I should emphasize that in analyzing the intent of the
contracting states, I am looking primarily at constructed rather than actual
intent. When there is sufficient evidence of actual intent, that intent will trump
the default gap-filling principles proposed here, and as described below, the
adoption of clearer defaults may in fact spur the parties to address the gaps that
currently exist. But in the absence of a discernible actual intent, the task here,
as in contract law, is to construct what the parties likely would have wanted
based on a hypothetical bargain. And the hypothetical bargain analysis is an 
intent-driven inquiry because it focuses on the purposes the parties sought to 
achieve rather than simply filling in gaps with whatever the adjudicator
believes would be the optimal provision.126 
Before turning to the proposed tools and their respective strengths and
weaknesses in the next two Sections, I begin with a more general argument for
why a contractual approach is functionally superior to the public law
framework. The basic argument is that a contractual approach properly focuses
the tribunal’s inquiry on an issue that the tribunal is better equipped and has the
legitimacy to resolve. With respect to administrability, there are some
differences among the particular tools that I will address below, but the general
point is that an inquiry into intent relies on legal concepts that do not require
the weighing of incommensurable values. Indeed, the intent inquiry is designed
to largely avoid examining the substance of the policy at all. Accordingly,
tribunals would be able to decide regulatory disputes based on legal principle
rather than policy discretion.
With respect to legitimacy, that value would follow to some extent from
124. Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 73, at 297; see also Stephan W. Schill,
Multilateralizing Investment Treaties Through Most-Favored Nation Clauses, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 
496, 560 (2009) (“BITs are not ordinary contracts between private parties, but international treaties to be
interpreted according to rules and rationales that differ from those in the interpretation and application of
commercial contracts.”).
125. Professor Anthea Roberts refers to this as the paradigm of public international law, as
distinguished from both private law and public law. Roberts, supra note 26, at 62-63. Roberts also notes
the unique challenges arising from the fact that the parties involved in the dispute are different from the
ones that made the agreement. Id. at 59-61.
126. See David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract
Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1831-32 (1991) (“To construct the hypothetical bargain, then,
one should ask what stipulated term makes sense of the parties’ project, as the parties themselves
understand it?”).
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more principled reasoning alone. But there is another important respect in
which a contractual analysis would reduce legitimacy concerns: by allowing
tribunals to act more as agents seeking to effectuate the intent of the states as
principals and less as trustees exercising their own independent judgment.127 As
explained above, the concern with the proportionality test is that international
arbitrators lack the legitimacy to exercise the policymaking authority the test
requires. And even the deferential approach, while giving states wide latitude to
regulate as they see fit, ultimately requires tribunals to draw boundaries that are 
grounded in policy judgments, however modest. By contrast, a contractual
approach would not require a tribunal to independently assess the validity of
the host state’s regulatory acts. Instead, it would evaluate those acts as part of
an effort to enforce the limits that the parties themselves prescribed.
The preceding analysis of legitimacy also helps to address the concern
raised by proponents of the public law approach that a private law framework
fails to adequately account for state sovereignty concerns. That objection is
compelling when a tribunal treats investors and states as equal in status and
thereby overlooks the latter’s prerogative to regulate in the public interest.128 
But the objection has less force when tribunals merely seek to enforce a valid
agreement between two co-equal states to limit their own regulatory capacities.
Enforcing the agreement is in that sense a way to respect rather than restrict
their sovereignty.
Finally, I would note that the general idea of shifting control or influence
from the tribunals and back to the states is one that others have endorsed. For
example, Professor Jason Yackee argues that states should reassert their
interpretive authority by creating BITs with additional control mechanisms that
would enable the states to veto or otherwise influence tribunal decisions.129 
Likewise, Professor Anthea Roberts argues that tribunals should pay greater
attention to the preferences of treaty parties as expressed through subsequent
practice or interpretive agreements.130 Those suggestions are consistent with the
proposals made here and share a common concern that the states have taken a
backseat to tribunals in the proper interpretation of investment treaties. The
primary difference is that Yackee and Roberts focus on institution-level 
reforms or otherwise urge the states themselves to take on a greater role in
interpreting their BITs. I offer suggestions on what the tribunals can do more
immediately to better respect states’ intent and potentially to spur them to speak
more clearly.131 
127. This is not to suggest that there is no sense in which tribunals should act as trustees, only
that the public law approach would push them too far in that direction. For a general discussion of when
tribunals should perform one or the other roles, see Karen J. Alter, Agents or Trustees? International
Courts in Their Political Context, 14 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 33, 39-40 (2008).
128. See Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 73, at 297.
129. See Jason Webb Yackee, Controlling the International Investment Law Agency, 53 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 391, 434-45 (2012).
130. See Roberts, supra note 37, at 179.
131. That is not to say that the tools proposed here must necessarily be interim. As I discuss in
Section III.D below, they could also be made permanent either through codification in particular BITs or
if adopted by tribunals through a process of common law development.
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B. A Default Rule Approach
In contract law, when courts confront a gap in the agreement, they often
fall back on default rules to resolve the dispute. For example, under the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), if the parties fail to specify a place of
delivery, the default is the seller’s place of business.132 The term is a default
one because the parties can override it by specifying a different one. The
primary benefit of a default rule is that it yields a clear answer, which makes it 
both more easily administrable for the courts and more predictable for the
parties to plan around. The alternative would be to conduct a more standards-
driven inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the transaction to make the
best possible estimate of the parties’ intent.133 The primary tradeoff between the
two approaches is that standards facilitate ex post accuracy while rules promote 
ex ante clarity.134 
The potential benefits of the default rule approach are readily apparent in
the context of investor-state regulatory disputes. A rule-based approach would 
be the easiest possible test for tribunals to administer. Moreover, predictability 
would seem to be particularly valuable to the contracting states and third-party-
beneficiary investors given the stakes involved. Because of the costs and 
resources associated with enacting regulations and investing in a foreign
country, all parties involved would likely appreciate being able to plan without
the uncertainty of how a future tribunal will determine their rights and 
obligations. There is a plausible argument, therefore, that the need for ex ante
clarity outweighs the value that potentially more accurate ex post analysis
would offer.135 
The conventional way to identify the appropriate default rule is the
majoritarian approach, which instructs courts to choose the term “that the
majority of parties would agree upon if negotiating and drafting a relevant
provision were cost-free.”136 The rationale behind this approach is that it
increases efficiency by enabling most parties to rest on the default term and
avoid the transaction costs of formally incorporating it into their agreement.137 
In the present context, the proper majoritarian default rule would likely be one
that resolves regulatory disputes in the host state’s favor. It bears emphasizing
that this rule would not preclude investors from invoking fair and equitable
treatment to challenge other concerns, including bad faith, lack of due process, 
132. U.C.C. § 2-308 (2002).
133. See George S. Geis, Economics as Context for Contract Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 590-
91 (2008) (reviewing VICTOR GOLDBERG, FRAMING CONTRACT LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
(2006)).
134. See id.
135. Cf. Sanders, supra note 24, at 344 (arguing against the use of the multi-factor Penn
Central test for indirect expropriation claims because foreign investors need the certainty of a clear rule 
to determine where to invest). As I explain in Section III.D below, I do not ultimately take a position on
whether the default rule approach is superior to one of the proposed default standards but I am merely
trying to highlight the relevant tradeoffs.
136. Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 
608, 613-14 (1998).
137. Id. at 614.
       
        
  
           
           
             
     
           
          
            
              
        
       
            
             
        
          
      
            
          
          
        
        
           
             
       
       
         
           
       
          
           
       
            
         
             
           
 
       
               
           
          
         
    
       
   
             
           
               
  
             
        
295_CHEN_CONTRACTUAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/15 1:57 PM
2015] A Contractual Approach to Investor-State Regulatory Disputes 319
and harassing or coercive conduct by state officials.138 But to the extent an
investor bases its claim solely on a departure from regulatory stability, the
majoritarian default rule would hold this claim to be outside the scope of the
fair and equitable treatment guarantee.
A few reasons support the conclusion that most states would prefer a
general rule resolving regulatory disputes in favor of host states. The first is
that states generally stand to lose a great deal more if found liable as host states
in a regulatory dispute than what they stand to gain as home states from an
investor’s successful claim. The former not only is experienced much more
directly, but also presents the risk of a catastrophically high award of
damages.139 The force of this point is diminished somewhat by the fact that
capital investments do not flow equally both ways. But the trends in this regard
are changing. Although traditionally investment flowed to developing nations
from developed ones, increasing levels of investment are flowing in the
opposite direction, and even developed states now must respond to claims
brought by foreign investors.140 As a result of such shifts, the United States, to
give one example, has revised its model BIT to place more limitations on 
investor rights despite the fact that it is a significant exporter of capital and
would stand to benefit from strong investor protections.141 
Moreover, even states that are predominantly capital-exporting have an
important reason to prefer that the burden of harm fall on the investor rather
than the host states, at least as a general rule. That reason stems from the
analysis above recognizing that investment treaties are designed to promote 
long-term economic cooperation and not to require investment protection at all 
costs. The states themselves, and not only commentators and tribunals, have
recognized this point and are acting accordingly in more recent BITs.142 
Because even predominantly capital-exporting states should be more interested
in long-term cooperation than in ensuring protection for any one investor, they 
should be concerned about overly constraining the regulatory flexibility of their
partner states, which may then be inclined to exit the international investment
regime, as some have already attempted to do.143 Thus, while individual states
in particular circumstances may opt to go a different route, the proper
majoritarian default for BITs in general would be one that permits states to
enact good-faith regulations in the public interest without being subject to
138. See Knoll-Tudor, supra note 52, at 322-35.
139. For example, Joshua Simmons cites eight examples of investors obtaining awards over one
hundred million dollars. Joshua B. Simmons, Valuation in Investor-State Arbitration: Toward a More
Exact Science, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 196, 196 n.2 (2012). Although Simmons does not distinguish 
among different types of treaty violations, at least a few of the cited examples involved violations of the 
fair and equitable treatment obligation.
140. See Roberts, supra note 37, at 196.
141. Id. at 197 n.84.
142. See Roberts, supra note 26, at 80 (“[A]n increasing number of investment treaties are
including provisions in their preambles that make clear that investment promotion and protection are not 
to be achieved at the expense of other key values, such as protection of health, safety, labor standards,
and the environment.”).
143. See Roberts, supra note 37, at 191-92 (noting that a few states have withdrawn from the
ICSID Convention and more may do so if the regime evolves in an unfavorable direction).
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liability under the fair and equitable treatment standard.
Although the adoption of a majoritarian default rule is designed to
approximate the parties’ intent (as well as any general rule could), it is
important to emphasize that this is not meant to be the end of the conversation. 
One of the values of the rule-based approach is that it puts the parties involved 
on clear notice of how the tribunal will interpret the term at issue.144 If the
adopted interpretation does not comport with the preferences of particular
states, they are free to codify the opposite view or—more likely in this
setting—to revise the rule to be less absolute. But whether they do so or not, 
the use of a clear rule allows tribunals to shift the responsibility for the term’s
meaning to the contracting states themselves and thereby reduce concerns about
the legitimacy of their decisions.145 
As an illustration, consider the Philip Morris–Uruguay dispute described
in the introduction of this Article. To establish a violation of fair and equitable
treatment, Philip Morris could not merely claim that the regulations altered the
legal framework in a way that diminished Philip Morris’s investments. Philip
Morris would instead have to show bad faith, meaning that Uruguay acted not
to achieve legitimate policy objectives but rather to extort profits from the 
company or to achieve some political gain at the company’s expense.146 No
allegations in this vein are present. Philip Morris’s claim under fair and
equitable treatment is simply that the adopted “measures frustrate one of the 
most fundamental expectations that any investor may have, which is that a host
State will comply with its own law and respect private property.”147 Under the
default rule proposed here, Philip Morris’s fair and equitable claim would fail
in the absence of new facts suggesting bad faith on the part of Uruguay.
There is an alternative approach to selecting defaults that is likely
inappropriate for the present context but worth briefly considering. This
approach, known as the penalty default, involves supplying a term that is
actually contrary to the parties’ likely preferences to create an incentive for the 
parties to specify their intent more clearly.148 As relevant here, penalty defaults
are justified when one of the parties has more knowledge but prefers to keep
the contract strategically incomplete to avoid disclosing its superior
information.149 As Professors Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner explain, “[o]ne
144. See Geis, supra note 133, at 590-91.
145. Cf. Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78
VA. L. REV. 821, 827 (1992) (“Under certain circumstances, it is not at all fictitious to characterize a 
choice to remain silent and let default rules operate as an expression of consent . . . . And, even when
parties cannot be said to have consented by their silence to the enforcement of particular default rules,
enforcement may still be justified on the grounds of consent when default rules are chosen to reflect the
commonsense or conventional understanding of most parties.”).
146. See generally Deyan Draguiev, Bad Faith Conduct of States in Violation of the ‘Fair and
Equitable Treatment’ Standard in International Investment Law and Arbitration, 5 J. INT’L DISP.
SETTLEMENT 273, 284-85 (2014).
147. See Philip Morris, Request for Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶ 84. The argument that Uruguay
failed to “comply with its own law” is that the measures adopted by the Ministry of Public Health
exceed what was contemplated in the legislation passed by the Uruguayan parliament. See id. ¶¶ 20-24.
148. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989).
149. See id. at 94. The other rationale is to incentivize parties to disclose information to courts.
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party might strategically withhold information that would increase the total
gains from contracting (the ‘size of the pie’) in order to increase her private 
share of the gains from contracting (her ‘share of the pie’).”150 A penalty
default rule seeks to disincentivize such strategic withholding and thereby 
facilitate the creation of the more socially optimal bargain.
The penalty default approach has some initial appeal in the present
context. Tribunals could adopt the opposite of the majoritarian default term and
require states to pay compensation for harm whenever their good-faith
regulations substantially decreased the value of a foreign investment. As a
result, most states would be incentivized to revise the default term, thereby
revealing information about their regulatory plans to their counterparts and to
the third-party-beneficiary investors, who could then make better decisions
about where to invest. Although any default rule has this information-forcing
effect,151 the incentive is weaker under a majoritarian default regime because
states might be more willing to live with its rough approximation of their
preferences and say nothing more.
Despite the benefits of increasing information disclosure, a penalty
default approach may not be justified if the value of that revealed information 
is outweighed by the increased costs of contracting around the default.152 More
importantly for this particular context, given the already serious concerns about 
their legitimacy, it is difficult to imagine tribunals expressly choosing to
“penalize” states with a term that contradicts their likely preferences and
deciding cases against them while they scramble to revise the default. Thus,
whatever theoretical appeal a penalty default approach may hold, it is not likely
as a practical matter to be implemented by tribunals.
Returning to the majoritarian default discussion, recent practice suggests
that changes in response to tribunal interpretations are more than a theoretical 
possibility. For example, states have begun to expand the exceptions provisions
in their BITs in response to concerns about their regulatory flexibility. States
have included such provisions in some form in their BITs for as long as BITs
have existed.153 A typical provision would state that “[t]his treaty shall not
preclude the application by either Party of any and all measures necessary for
the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect 
to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, or the
Id. at 97. But that justification exists primarily to prevent parties from shifting costs “to a subsidized
judicial system.” Id. at 99. The rationale therefore does not make sense in the context of investor-state 
arbitration, which is not paid for by anyone other than the disputing parties.
150. Id.
151. See Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law, 33 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 563, 573 (2006) (“A majoritarian rule is information-forcing because the minority types will
contract out of it if transaction costs are low enough, revealing both their valuations and the valuations
of the majority that does not opt out. The only difference between the two rules is that more parties opt
out of—or would prefer to opt out of—a penalty default rule than out of a majoritarian default rule,
everything else held equal.”).
152. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 148, at 128.
153. See William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in
Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures in Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 307, 326-27 (2008).
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protection of its own essential security interests.”154 More recent treaties,
however, have gone a step beyond security concerns to exempt measures
designed to protect public health.155 If the proposed majoritarian default term
does not align with their preferences, contracting states could continue down 
this road of drafting more detailed provisions about what types of measures
should and should not be subject to challenge under the fair and equitable
treatment standard.
In a similar vein, a recent study by the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) catalogued the ways in which states have
used “reservations” to specify particular industries for which they are reserving 
their regulatory flexibility.156 Such provisions differ from exceptions clauses in
that the latter focus on the purpose of the regulation at issue and potentially
span multiple sectors.157 The reservations discussed in the UNCTAD study, by
contrast, specify that regulations in certain areas, like agricultural and
transportation services, will be exempt from the investment treaty’s substantive
protections.158 Another distinguishing feature of reservations is that they need
not be mutual: each state can identify the particular areas they want to 
exclude.159 To date, reservations have primarily been adopted in relation to an
investment treaty’s “liberalization commitments” as opposed to its
“[p]rotection obligations.”160 The former include provisions like the national
treatment principle, requiring a host state to treat foreigners the same as its own 
nationals, while the latter include more absolute rules such as the prohibition on 
expropriation without compensation.161 Although the UNCTAD study does not
discuss fair and equitable treatment specifically, at least the stability component
of that guarantee would not seem to be absolute and thus should be a
permissible subject for reservation.
While states have begun adapting the language of new BITs, there is less
evidence that they have gone back to alter existing BITs. Given the time and
resources required for states to amend treaties,162 there is a concern that the
adoption of a default term would effectively be the last word for all existing
BITs. Commentators have suggested other ways, however, in which contracting
states could make their intent clearer. If an investor’s home state expresses 
154. Id. at 327 (quoting Treaty Concerning the Treatment and Protection of Investments, U.S.-
Pan., art. X(1), Oct. 27, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1227).
155. See Barnali Choudhury, Exception Provisions as a Gateway to Incorporating Human
Rights Issues into International Investment Agreements, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 670, 688-89 
(2011) (citing examples).
156. U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., Preserving Flexibility in IIAs: The Use of
Reservations, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2005/8 (2006).
157. See id. at 7.
158. See id. at 64; see also id. at 24-25 (describing in greater detail the variety of ways in which 
reservations can specify exempted measures). In principle, exceptions clauses need not be mutual either,
as each contracting state could bargain for different exclusions based on its own needs. But to my
knowledge existing BITs have not included such asymmetrical exceptions clauses.
159. See id. at 21-22.
160. See id. at 66 n.13.
161. See id.
162. See, e.g., Kingsbury & Schill, supra note 56, at 51 (“[I]n the investment treaty context, the
revision of BITs is a slow and slow-acting process requiring consent of both contracting State parties.”).
       
        
  
          
         
      
            
            
             
         
             
             
       
          
 
          
            
         
          
         
         
          
          
  
          
         
         
          
              
         
          
    
    
        
        
              
        
      
       
        
           
           
          
    
 
       
      
295_CHEN_CONTRACTUAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/15 1:57 PM
2015] A Contractual Approach to Investor-State Regulatory Disputes 323
agreement with the host state’s position in the course of an investment dispute,
tribunals could decide to credit that shared interpretation.163 Likewise, if the
two states adopt an interpretive agreement to memorialize their understanding 
of a term like the fair and equitable treatment guarantee, that may be sufficient
to establish the meaning of that term for purposes of the BIT at issue.164 
Nothing in my proposal here requires states to use a formal amendment process
to override the default interpretation. And while tribunals have expressed some
reluctance to rely on views expressed in these other forms, they should be more
willing to do so if they impose a default rule approach on states given that one
goal of this approach is to elicit further dialogue.
Two additional concerns warrant further consideration. The first is that
this approach is unfair to investors that may have committed to foreign ventures
in reliance on the protections of a fair and equitable treatment guarantee.
Particularly since that guarantee has been interpreted to require some degree of
stability, this objection does have force with respect to investments that are
already in place. But from a long-term perspective, the broader community of
investors will benefit even from a default rule that is unfavorable to them
because clarity will facilitate better planning. And as noted above, just because
the default is initially set against investors does not mean that some states will
not revise that rule in a way that gives investors more protection, along with 
greater certainty than they currently possess.
A second point worth acknowledging is that the majoritarian default rule
proposed here would serve as a weaker check on state conduct than even the 
deferential approaches I discussed above. But as I explained in that discussion,
the problem with the deferential approaches was not that they provided a weak
check, but that they did so based on an unpersuasive analogy to domestic public
law. The default rule approach, by contrast, is justified as an approximation of
the contracting states’ intent and by the goal of eliciting further clarification
from the states themselves.
C. Two Default Standards
A default rule approach is by necessity a crude approximation of what the
states themselves would want. A default standards approach, by contrast, would
seek to produce a more accurate estimate of states’ intent with respect to a
particular case while sacrificing the predictability of a rule-based approach. It
does so by identifying factors, based on plausible assumptions about state
preferences, to guide the tribunal’s analysis rather than providing a one-size-
fits-all solution. This Section proposes two alternative default standards derived 
from attempts in contract theory to address a similar problem of ambiguous
intent. Like a default rule, these standards are meant to fill a gap in the meaning
of fair and equitable treatment as applied to regulatory disputes, but they can be
overridden if the states so choose.
163. See Roberts, supra note 37, 217-20.
164. See id. at 215-17.
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To begin calibrating the appropriate default standard, it is necessary to
identify the relevant state interests at stake. As noted above, it is increasingly
common for investment to flow in both directions under a given BIT, and in 
any event both sides share an interest in long-term economic cooperation. 
These are reasons why, as outlined in the prior Section, states would not want
investment protection to be absolute. But the objective of long-term economic
cooperation also counsels against allowing host states too much regulatory 
flexibility, which the proposed majoritarian default would potentially provide.
Specifically, the concern about maximizing regulatory flexibility at the expense
of investment protection is that it may discourage some foreign firms from
investing at all. Such an outcome would fail to satisfy the goal of economic
cooperation, disappointing the expectations of capital importers and capital
exporters alike. Thus, maximizing regulatory flexibility might be the best
available general rule for purposes of setting a majoritarian default, but a 
proper default standard should strike a better balance between the competing 
objectives of investment protection and regulatory flexibility.
Contract law addresses a similar problem in the context of changed
circumstances. The problem of changed circumstances arises when some risk
not allocated in the contract materializes and dramatically alters the bargain the
parties originally struck. As a general rule, contract law allocates to the 
promisor the risk that her performance will be made more burdensome in light
of a supervening, post-formation event.165 But the law also recognizes that in
some instances changed circumstances will justify excusing the promisor’s
nonperformance. While the risks of a supervening event can always be
allocated by agreement, contract theory offers two alternative tests for
assessing when the promisor’s obligation should be discharged in the absence 
of such a provision.
The present problem can likewise be understood as a concern about
changed circumstances, with a minor adjustment.166 While the contract law
question is whether changed circumstances permit a promisor to excuse
nonperformance, the question here is whether changed circumstances permit a
host state to revise its regulatory framework without implicating its fair and 
equitable treatment obligation. But the basic objective in applying a default
standard is the same in both contexts: to determine whether the changed
circumstances at issue were of the sort that the parties themselves would have 
deemed legally significant.
To be clear, the goal of adapting these principles from contract theory is
to give meaning to the vague concept of fair and equitable treatment and
understand how it should apply to good-faith regulations that incidentally harm
165. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 9.6, at 625 (4th ed. 2004).
166. Beyond the general concept of changed circumstances, it would not be helpful to analogize
to the more specific doctrines of impracticability and frustration of purpose. See id. § 9.6, at 624-33 
(describing impracticability); id. § 9.7, at 634-40 (describing frustration of purpose). In revising its
regulatory framework to address changed circumstances, the host state has not been forced to do
anything impracticable, nor has its purpose in entering the BIT been negated. As emphasized in the main
text, the goal of the analogy here is to think more generally about how changed circumstances might 
inform the concept of fair and equitable treatment.
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foreign investment. By examining how contract law principles from the excuse
context may shed light on that question, I am not suggesting that we approach
the issue as one of excuse as such. Indeed, it would be assuming the conclusion
to say that all good-faith regulatory changes are violations of the fair and
equitable treatment guarantee and thus require the state to rely on an excuse 
defense. My purpose in adapting these contract theory concepts is instead to
help determine whether the contracting states would likely have deemed such 
conduct to be violations of fair and equitable treatment in the first place.167 
The distinction just drawn also explains why it would not make sense to
incorporate contract law’s high bar requiring an extraordinary change in 
circumstances.168 Of course, for the tests to make sense there must be
something in the world that the state can point to as a changed circumstance. If
the state is addressing a problem that predated the BIT and truly has no new
facets, its argument would be a nonstarter. But the bar for changed
circumstances in the present context should otherwise be a low one. The high
bar in contract law is based on the presumption that a promisor bears the
ordinary risks of obstacles to its performance and should not be able to so 
readily resort to excuse. But that presumption does not apply in the present
context because, as explained above, the purpose of the tests would be to
determine whether the fair and equitable treatment obligation has been violated 
at all, not whether an excuse is permitted.
A final caveat to emphasize is that the proposed tests do not contemplate
that the tribunals would evaluate the substance of the policies being challenged. 
After determining whether the supervening event satisfied the chosen test, the
tribunal would not go on to evaluate whether the host state’s response to that 
event was necessary or justified. The latter inquiry would raise the same 
concerns I identified in the public law framework, with tribunals being asked to 
independently assess the validity of a state’s policy. It might be necessary for
the tribunal to screen for pretext so that states do not point to changed
circumstances that have nothing to do with the new regulation. But beyond that
threshold inquiry the substance of the policy would not be examined.
With that background, the following two Subsections discuss the two
alternative approaches that contract theory has developed to address changed
circumstances and adapt them to the problem of regulatory disputes.
167. Most investment treaties do provide for a type of excuse defense, which is known as
necessity. See, e.g., Choudhury, supra note 7, at 805-06 (describing how tribunals analyzed Argentina’s
necessity defense based on a severe economic crisis). I will not discuss necessity at length here, except
to note that there is some potential overlap with the proposed changed circumstances analysis: once a
tribunal determines that the fair and equitable treatment obligation has been violated, the same facts that 
were relevant to liability may again be relevant under the necessity analysis.
168. What must be extraordinary is the degree to which performance has been rendered
impracticable or, in the case of frustration of purpose, the extent to which the value of the performance
to the promisee has been negated. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 165, § 9.6, at 627-28; id. § 9.7, at 636. 
Translating that high bar to the present context would mean that the state would have to be able to point
to a genuine crisis requiring a drastic response, as opposed to merely new developments in society.
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1. Foreseeability
A central factor in analyzing the significance of changed circumstances is
whether the supervening event was foreseeable. The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts does not specifically mention foreseeability, but instead says that the
nonoccurrence of the supervening event must have been “a basic assumption on 
which the contract was made.”169 However, as the comments to the
Restatement explain, the fact that an event “was not reasonably foreseeable
when the contract was made” would support a conclusion that the
nonoccurrence of that event was in fact a basic assumption.170 The UCC
commentary likewise explains that the excuse defense is not available “when
the contingency in question is sufficiently foreshadowed at the time of
contracting to be included among the business risks which are fairly to be 
regarded as part of the dickered terms.”171 
The underlying premise of the foreseeability test is that if the supervening
event invoked to support the promisor’s defense was sufficiently within the
parties’ contemplation, then it makes sense to treat the promisor as having 
assumed the risk of that event’s occurrence.172 That is because the promisor had
an opportunity to bargain to place a condition on her performance based on that
risk. If the agreement is silent on the issue, courts may infer from the parties’ 
silence that they did not intend to alter the general rule that the risk of burdened
performance falls on the promisor.173 The promisor is thus presumed to have 
priced the potential downside consequences into the agreement.174 If, however,
the supervening event was not foreseeable, then that inference no longer holds, 
as the parties could not be presumed to have priced the risk into the bargain
they struck. Thus, rather than allocating the risk to the promisor, courts find an 
169. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 261, 265 (1979).
170. Id. § 261 cmt. c (1979).
171. U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 8 (2012). It is also worth noting that the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties includes foreseeability as a factor in the changed circumstances analysis. See Vienna
Convention, supra note 120, art. 62(1) (providing that “[a] fundamental change in circumstances which
has occurred with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not
foreseen by the parties,” may permit a party to terminate or withdraw from a treaty under certain
conditions). I do not suggest that investment tribunals rely directly on the Vienna Convention because 
the relevant provision applies when a state seeks to terminate or withdraw from a treaty or suspend its
operation based on changed circumstances. In seeking to enact a regulation without having to 
compensate burdened foreign investors, a host state would generally not be looking to take any of those 
more drastic steps with regard to the investment treaty as a whole.
172. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 165, § 9.6, at 631.
173. Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court explained the issue as follows:
The purpose of a contract is to place the risks of performance upon the promisor, and the
relation of the parties, terms of the contract, and circumstances surrounding its formation must
be examined to determine whether it can be fairly inferred that the risk of the event that has
supervened to cause the alleged frustration was not reasonably foreseeable. If it was 
foreseeable there should have been provision for it in the contract, and the absence of such
provision gives rise to the inference that the risk was assumed.
Lloyd v. Murphy, 153 P.2d 47, 50 (Cal. 1944).
174. See John Elofson, The Dilemma of Changed Circumstances in Contract Law: An
Economic Analysis of the Foreseeability and Superior Risk Bearer Tests, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 
1, 4 (1996) (noting that “we can assume that the promisor has demanded and received a risk premium in 
return for assuming all the risks that he could reasonably have anticipated, and therefore that his
obligations should not be discharged if one of those risks does in fact materialize”).
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implied condition in the agreement that the promisor’s performance was
contingent on the nonoccurrence of the supervening event.175 
The same rationale makes foreseeability a plausible basis for deciding
investor-state regulatory disputes. The underlying premise would be that
contracting states wanted the fair and equitable treatment guarantee to
encompass a commitment of regulatory stability as to foreseeable supervening
events because each host state could price those risks into their agreement. At
the same time, the contracting states would have wanted host states to retain
flexibility to address unforeseeable changed circumstances and not have to
compensate foreign investors for any lost value that new regulations caused.
Notably, an intuition along these lines is already lurking in the literature,
as commentators often cite unforeseen events as a reason to disfavor
interpreting the fair and equitable treatment guarantee to include a strong
stability commitment. For example, Schill argues that “tribunals should allow
for a certain flexibility for host states to react, for instance, to emergency
situations.”176 Thus, there appears to be general agreement that a host state is
most justified in changing the regulatory framework when it is responding to
some unexpected supervening event. But from this indisputable premise that
host states need flexibility to respond to emergency situations, Schill goes on to 
conclude that tribunals should always balance investor rights and sovereignty
concerns without limiting the state’s prerogative to such unforeseen events.177 
No justification is provided for making that leap. The proposal here would limit
the host state’s flexibility to the situations in which most agree flexibility is
truly needed.
In practice, much depends on how high the threshold is set for what is
considered unforeseeable. In contract law, many U.S. jurisdictions set a high
threshold because courts are reluctant to find implied conditions on a
promisor’s performance. Under this view, for example, sharp price increases
due to supply shortages would not be considered unforeseeable to the
promisor.178 Some more unusual event, outside the ordinary experience of the
parties, is required. If investment tribunals adopted this view of foreseeability,
then only extraordinary events, such as the outbreak of war or a natural 
disaster, would meet the threshold—and even then only if there were no
warnings that those particular risks were brewing. Absent some external shock
to the system, ordinary developments, such as economic downturns or
environmental degradation, would be deemed to have been foreseeable.
175. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 165, § 9.5, at 623-24; see also Elofson, supra note 174, at 4
(noting that the occurrence of an unforeseeable event may “remove[] the situation from the scope of the
parties’ expectation”).
176. Stephan W. Schill, Fair and Equitable Treatment, the Rule of Law, and Comparative
Public Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW, supra note 79, at
151, 165; see also Kingsbury & Schill, supra note 56, at 18 (noting that stability cannot be absolute
because “a serious crisis or even an emergency situation may call for different reactions than the
deployment of public power in the normal course of things”).
177. See Schill, supra note 176, at 165-66.
178. See H. Ward Classen, Judicial Intervention in Contractual Relationships Under the
Uniform Commercial Code and Common Law, 42 S.C. L. REV. 379, 386 (1991) (citing Maple Farms,
Inc. v. City Sch. Dist., 352 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Sup. Ct. 1974)).
       
         
 
        
        
            
          
           
            
      
           
             
            
          
 
         
            
          
         
            
      
             
           
          
              
         
           
        
            
     
 
          
        
        
          
        
        
            
          
         
          
        
      
         
 
      
            
 
           
  
295_CHEN_CONTRACTUAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/15 1:57 PM
328 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 40: 295
Some courts and commentators have expressed concerns about setting the 
bar too high. They do so out of recognition that even foreseeable risks may be
too remote for the parties to want to spend time bargaining over their
allocation.179 One court has suggested that the question should instead be
whether, “based on past experience, [the supervening event] was of such
reasonable likelihood that the obligor . . . should have guarded against it or 
provided for non-liability against the risk.”180 Similarly, one commentator 
proposes that the analysis focus on whether there is information available at the
time of formation to put the promisor on notice of the possibility of the
supervening event.181 Framing the test in this way has the advantage of
allowing courts to focus on concrete evidence rather than having to speculate in
the abstract about what the promisor should have anticipated.
If investment tribunals adopted something closer to this view of
foreseeability, then a host state could address new problems that were not
within its contemplation at the time the treaty was ratified without implicating
the fair and equitable treatment guarantee. An external shock to the system
would not be necessary; the problem could instead materialize, for example, as
the result of an unexpected confluence of previously existing forces.
Importantly, setting the bar at this level would still give investors a valid claim
when a host state changes policy because a new government with different
preferences took control. Likewise, under this version of the foreseeability test
investors would have a valid claim when the state makes changes in response to
a problem about which information had begun to emerge at the time of
ratification. For example, a public health crisis that grew out of pollution
concerns that were apparent at the time of ratification would be deemed
foreseeable. By contrast, a public health crisis that grew out of a combination
of population migrations and mutations in previously existing viruses would be
deemed unforeseeable.
In the present context, the lower bar would likely be a better
approximation of the contracting states’ intent. In a typical private contract
involving discrete and relatively well-defined obligations, it is reasonable to 
presume that the parties have priced in all but the most extremely remote
contingencies into their agreement. But the fair and equitable treatment
guarantee is far more expansive than any obligation a private party could enter
into. Modern states are involved in regulating all spheres of life, and nearly all
of those have the potential to affect foreign investment. When a state commits
to regulatory stability as part of the fair and equitable treatment guarantee, 
everything that happens within its borders or otherwise falls within its
jurisdiction is a potentially relevant risk. Thus, unlike parties to a private 
contract, states cannot realistically price even relatively proximate 
contingencies into their agreement. Given the vast scope and complexity of
179. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 165, § 9.6, at 630-31.
180. Id. § 9.6, at 632 (quoting Opera Co. v. Wolf Trap Found., 817 F.2d 1094, 1103 (4th Cir. 
1987)).
181. Stephen J. Sirianni, The Developing Law of Commercial Impracticability and 
Impossibility: Part I, 14 UCC L.J. 30, 61-62 (1981).
       
        
  
             
         
           
       
             
   
         
      
        
          
           
          
           
           
            
   
            
       
             
         
            
        
          
      
 
           
          
           
            
           
        
        
       
             
         
          
             
         
           
  
            
 
           
               
           
            
              
295_CHEN_CONTRACTUAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/15 1:57 PM
2015] A Contractual Approach to Investor-State Regulatory Disputes 329
issues to which modern states need to respond, it is more likely that they
intended their stability commitment to apply to regulatory concerns that are
more directly within their contemplation at the time of ratification. Concerns
outside that zone would not be foreseeable, and therefore any regulatory 
revisions undertaken in response to them would be outside the scope of the fair 
and equitable treatment guarantee.
As a further illustration, consider again the Philip Morris–Uruguay
dispute. Under a foreseeability analysis, Philip Morris would likely have been 
able to show that Uruguay had adequate notice of the public health concerns
surrounding smoking at the time the Uruguay-Switzerland BIT entered into
force in 1991.182 One can imagine closer cases involving contested questions
about exactly when the available scientific evidence was sufficient to charge a
host state with foreseeing the problem. But in the case of smoking, it would be
difficult to deny that the evidence of its harms was well-established by 1991.
Thus, applying a foreseeability analysis would likely result in an award in
Philip Morris’s favor.
Seeing this outcome may lead some to object that a foreseeability test
places too much of a burden on states to anticipate their future regulatory 
agendas. Of course, states would prefer in the abstract to be free to adjust their
regulatory frameworks based, for example, on new expertise or different policy
goals. But each state has to balance that preference against the value it gains by 
making a meaningful stability commitment, namely attracting foreign
investment and increased protection for its own investors operating in the
counterpart state. A foreseeability line strikes a plausible compromise between
these competing concerns.
Moreover, it should be reiterated that, as with default rules, states retain
the ability to specify a different approach in their BITs. They could, for
example, opt out of the foreseeability analysis entirely by declaring that their
fair and equitable obligation does not extend to good-faith regulations in the
public interest. They could also carve out particular limitations on their fair and
equitable treatment obligation, as in the examples of the exceptions clauses
described in the prior Section. It may not be realistic to do this on an issue-by-
issue basis, creating exceptions for something as specific as cigarette
marketing. But exceptions could be created at the categorical level. If a state’s
environmental or public health regulatory framework is underdeveloped and in
need of revising, the state could negotiate for categorical exceptions to preserve
flexibility in the needed areas while leaving the foreseeability test to serve as
the line elsewhere. In this way, like a default rule approach, the foreseeability
test can have the added benefit of encouraging the parties to specify their intent
more clearly.183 
A further objection to adopting the foreseeability analysis is that it is as
182. See Philip Morris, Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 3, ¶ 1.
183. See Elofson, supra note 174, at 38 (“In a jurisdiction in which the foreseeability test is
consistently applied, promisors will learn to demand exculpatory clauses or risk premiums in return for 
facing foreseeable risks. . . . By adopting relatively clear rules of liability, [the law] can encourage 
parties to allocate these risks themselves, rather than forcing a court to do it for them after the fact.”).
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indeterminate as a proportionality test. Certainly in contrast to the default rule
approach, a foreseeability test will not always yield clear answers. There is no
denying that foreseeability is an open-ended standard, but it is one courts have 
been entrusted with applying in a range of legal contexts.184 Many cases will be
clear-cut, as when there is smoking-gun evidence that a host state had direct
knowledge of a pending problem or, at the other end of the spectrum, when a
supervening event occurs that is wholly without precedent. There will also be
many close cases that require the exercise of judgment, but in drawing the
appropriate line, tribunals would at least be charged with analyzing just the 
single value of foreseeability, rather than having to exercise the policymaking
discretion required to balance incommensurable values.
2. Efficient Risk Bearer Analysis
Although foreseeability is the more commonly cited underlying principle, 
scholars using economic theory have suggested that the excuse doctrines are
better explained as a question of which party is better positioned to bear the risk 
of a particular changed circumstance.185 This conclusion follows from the
general premise that contract law seeks to promote economic efficiency.
Contracting parties are generally presumed to be seeking to maximize the value
of their exchange. When their contract contains a gap, it should be filled with a
term that best accomplishes that objective.186 With respect to changed
circumstances specifically, the gap should be filled by allocating the risk of a 
particular supervening event to the party better positioned to bear it.187 
Generally the superior risk bearer is the party that could better insure
against the event’s occurrence.188 To identify that party, courts consider which
party could better evaluate the risk at issue (including the probability of the
event’s occurrence and the magnitude of loss should the event occur) and
which could more cheaply purchase insurance or self-insure through
diversification.189 In a commonly cited example, the court in Transatlantic
Financing Corp. v. United States190 considered an excuse defense by a ship
owner, which had entered into a shipping contract with the U.S. government, 
based on an international crisis that led to the closing of the Suez Canal and the
blocking of the ship’s intended route.191 The court rejected the defense and
184. To name just a couple, courts apply foreseeability as a limitation on damages for breach of 
contract, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (1979), and consider foreseeability at as
many as three different points in a negligence analysis, see Benjamin C. Zipursky, Foreseeability in
Breach, Duty, and Proximate Cause, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1247, 1249-55 (2009). For additional
examples from family law, property law, and patent law, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability
and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1598-1600 (2009).
185. See Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in
Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 90 (1977).
186. See id. at 88-89.
187. See id. at 90-91.
188. See id. at 90.
189. See id. at 90-92.
190. 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
191. See id. at 314-15.
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reasoned as follows:
Transatlantic was no less able than the United States to purchase insurance to cover
the contingency’s occurrence. If anything, it is more reasonable to expect owner-
operators of vessels to insure against the hazards of war. They are in the best
position to calculate the cost of performance by alternative routes (and therefore to 
estimate the amount of insurance required), and are undoubtedly sensitive to
international troubles which uniquely affect the demand for and cost of their
services.192 
In short, the court deemed Transatlantic to be the more efficient bearer of
the risk that materialized.193 
Adapting to the present context, the issue must be framed a little
differently. The potential risk bearers are not the two contracting states, but
rather the host state and investor as third-party beneficiary. Moreover, the host
state cannot purchase insurance or self-insure in the sense of portfolio
diversification in this context. Thus, there is no way to perform an apples-to-
apples comparison to determine whether the host state or investor is the
superior risk bearer.
Nonetheless, the efficiency framework provides a useful rubric for
analyzing the ultimate issue in this context. Rather than attempting to compare 
the host state and investor, we can apply the same criteria of the difficulty of
risk appraisal and feasibility of insurance to just the investor. The more difficult 
a risk was to assess and insure against, the less efficient it would be for the 
investor to have done so. As with the foreseeability test, the question of
efficiency would be treated as a spectrum. Below a certain point on the
spectrum, an investor would not have been expected to procure insurance and
thus should be entitled to compensation from the host state. Above that point, 
the investor should expect to bear its own losses.
Like foreseeability, the principle of efficient risk bearing provides a
plausible basis for distinguishing between changed circumstances that should 
permit a state to respond without implicating fair and equitable treatment and 
those that should not. While the contract law assumption that parties seek to
maximize efficiency may not hold true for all the various forms of treaties
states may sign, it seems reasonable to assume that parties to BITs in particular
would take efficiency considerations seriously given their economic purpose.
The default proposed here therefore attributes to contracting states an intent to
compensate investors when they could not have efficiently insured against the 
risk of a particular regulatory development, while requiring investors to bear
their own losses when such insurance could have been efficiently obtained.
192. Id. at 319.
193. Posner and Rosenfield endorse the court’s reasoning as an illustration of superior risk
bearer analysis. See Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 185, at 103-05. Other scholars argue that the court
was wrong in its empirical assessment of which party could better appraise the risk, see, e.g., Melvin A.
Eisenberg, Impossibility, Impracticability, and Frustration, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 207, 252 (2009), and 
criticize Posner and Rosenfield’s broader theory as “virtually impossible to apply in practice,” id. at 251. 
Even critics like Eisenberg, however, concede that insurance considerations may be relevant in some
cases, such as when “there is a customary practice in a business sector to purchase . . . insurance” and
insurance options are “readily available.” Id. at 248.
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A few general observations will help to illustrate how a default standard
based on efficiency would apply to particular scenarios. First, with regard to 
risk appraisal, the investor would be better positioned to evaluate risks that
relate more closely to its specific business. For example, an oil and gas
company would typically have knowledge about the risks of environmental
degradation and how a state’s policy response is likely to affect its profit
margins. Conversely, the same company is less likely to have any specialized
knowledge about a state’s regulatory agenda in intellectual property law or be
in a good position to predict the harm any changes would pose to the
company’s value. Thus, a tribunal applying an efficient risk bearer analysis
would be more likely to require the company to bear its own losses in the
former scenario than in the latter.
Second, with regard to the possibility of insurance, an initial question 
would be whether market insurance for the relevant risk is available. For U.S.
companies, a government agency called the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC) provides coverage for certain forms of regulatory risk,
including “[m]aterial changes to feed-in tariffs” and “[r]evocations of licenses
or permits necessary for the operation of a project.”194 It is unlikely, however,
that OPIC would provide coverage for more general regulations that have a
diffuse impact given the difficulty of assessing such risks. When market 
insurance is not available, the feasibility of self-insurance should be examined. 
In other words, could the company realistically have spread the risk of a
particular form of loss by operating in different areas with distinct risk profiles? 
Factors in that analysis would include how large the company is, how
diversified its business is, and whether other geographic locations are available
to conduct the same sort of business.195 The more readily a company could
have obtained market insurance for or self-insured against the risk at issue, the
more likely a tribunal would conclude that the investor should bear its own
losses.
Consider the Philip Morris–Uruguay dispute as an illustration one last
time. Because the marketing regulations relate directly to Philip Morris’s core
business, the company could reasonably be expected to have evaluated the risks
of such developments and the impact they would have on its value. Moreover,
Philip Morris could and indeed has self-insured against the risk of loss due to
more aggressive public health regulations on smoking by operating in over 180
countries and ramping up specifically in developing states with weaker
regulatory regimes.196 Thus, applying an efficient risk bearer analysis would
likely point to the conclusion that Philip Morris was well-positioned to bear the
risk of the harm caused by Uruguay’s regulatory changes and thus should lose
194. Regulatory Risk, OPIC, http://www.opic.gov/what-we-offer/political-risk-insurance/types
-of-coverage/regulatory-risk (last visited Apr. 16, 2015).
195. See THOMAS J. MICELI, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 120 (2009) (noting such 
factors in assessing the feasibility of self-insurance).
196. See Trefis Team, Philip Morris’ Twin Strategies Keep It Smokin’ Hot, FORBES (Jan. 6,
2012, 7:59 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2012/01/06/philip-morris-twin
-strategies-keep-it-smokin-hot; Company Overview, PHILIP MORRIS INT’L, http://www.pmi.com/eng
/about_us/company_overview/pages/company_overview.aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2015).
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on its fair and equitable treatment claim.
As with foreseeability, one could object that the above analysis is as
indeterminate as a proportionality test. The answer here is largely the same as
above. Asking whether the investor could have efficiently insured against the 
risk does not require balancing incommensurable values, and efficiency in
general is a concept courts are traditionally comfortable applying.197 As with
foreseeability, there will be many clear-cut cases. At one end of the spectrum,
an extremely experienced investor with operations in numerous countries loses
value following a regulation it has seen countless times before; at the opposite
end, a small, novice investor loses value when the state revises general business
rules unrelated to the investor’s core expertise. Also, as with foreseeability, the
fact that there will be borderline cases does not mean that the basic analysis is
one that tribunals lack competence to apply.
A different sort of objection would point out that this analysis and
foreseeability point in different directions, raising the question of how both
could claim to approximate the contracting states’ intent. Indeed, the two tests
are roughly inverted versions of each other. Although the precise lines each test
would draw are based on different criteria, in essence the foreseeability test
places the burden on host states to plan for the risks of changed circumstances
while the efficient risk bearer test places that burden on investors. But in
suggesting that these tests could be used to approximate the contracting states’
intent, the point is not that either one provides a definitive conclusion as to the 
actual intent of any particular parties. Rather, both tests provide a principled
way to approach the issue and yield intuitively plausible approximations.
D. Implementation
The three tools just described are not meant to coexist as options for
every individual arbitral panel to choose among on an ad hoc basis. As I have 
acknowledged, the tools would in some cases point to different results,
potentially undermining the predictability that a shift to contract principles was
intended to foster. Instead, I suggest that one of the proposed approaches be
adopted wholesale.
This could be accomplished in one of two ways. One possibility alluded
to above would be for states themselves to codify a particular tool in individual 
BITs. I noted earlier that some states have withdrawn from the international 
investment law regime entirely,198 while others have incorporated language that
narrows the meaning of fair and equitable treatment or carves out exceptions in 
their more recent BITs.199 Future BITs could likewise codify one of the
solutions proposed here as an alternative or in addition to those steps.200 The
197. For example, the famous Hand formula for determining whether the standard of reasonable
care has been breached involves a kind of efficiency calculation—namely, assessing whether the burden 
of adequate precautions was less than the product of the probability of harm and the magnitude of loss.
See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
198. See supra text accompanying notes 8, 143.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 54, 155-158.
200. For example, two contracting states might first decide that fair and equitable treatment
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adopted test would then govern all disputes brought under the BIT at issue.
A second possibility would be for consensus to emerge around one of the
tools as part of a process of common law development. As noted earlier, 
arbitral decisions are not binding on anyone other than the parties themselves,
but there is nonetheless a norm of citing past decisions as persuasive
precedent.201 Just as some tribunals have begun employing proportionality
reasoning, others may be persuaded to apply one of the contractual approaches
proposed here, and over time a consensus may form regarding which one best
reflects the states’ intent.202 That test would then serve as the default rule or
standard for regulatory disputes, as always subject to override by contrary
indications in particular BITs.
In arguing that tribunals should adopt a contractual approach, I have not
taken a position as to which of the above proposals would be best. I believe all
of them would be superior to the public law framework from the standpoints of
encouraging principled reasoning and enhancing the legitimacy of the tribunals.
Choosing among them would depend on additional normative questions I do
not intend to take up here because doing so would require resolving deeply
contested issues about the fundamental purpose of international investment law
that have occupied much of the literature. My goal in highlighting potential 
tools from contract law and theory is instead to shift the existing discussion to
the set of alternatives proposed here and to encourage the normative debates to
continue in the context of choosing among them.
That said, I can briefly sketch a few of the relevant considerations. The
first choice is whether to adopt a rule- or standards-based approach. As noted 
above, that choice depends on whether one believes that ex ante clarity is more 
important than ex post accuracy in the particular context of regulatory
disputes.203 A related question is how much one trusts the arbitrators who
constitute investment tribunals to apply a standard as opposed to a rule. One 
should also weigh the importance of encouraging states to speak more clearly 
and consider which approach is more likely to produce that result.
If one concludes that a standards-based approach would be superior, the
next question is whether to adopt a foreseeability or efficient risk bearer
analysis. As alluded to earlier, the former test generally places a greater burden
on states, while the latter generally places a greater burden on investors. As I
should not apply at all to environmental and public health legislation, and thus create express exceptions
so that any changes to the regulatory framework in those areas would not give rise to investor claims.
They might then further decide that, for those regulatory areas to which the fair and equitable treatment
obligation does apply, tribunals should evaluate claims under a foreseeability test rather than a
proportionality analysis and define the standard accordingly.
201. See supra text accompanying note 45; see also Frédéric G. Sourgens, Law’s Laboratory:
Developing International Law on Investment Protection as Common Law, 34 NW. J. INT’L & BUS. 181, 
185-86 (2014) (proposing that investment tribunals develop principles based on a common law
approach).
202. I would also recognize the possibility that experimenting with a particular approach will
reveal that it leads to undesirable results in real cases. Common law reasoning should be pragmatic,
concerned primarily with whether a proposed approach effectively solves real-world problems rather
than with its theoretical appeal. See Sourgens, supra note 201, at 185.
203. See supra text accompanying note 134.
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have emphasized, both default standards attempt to reconcile the competing 
objectives of investment protection and regulatory flexibility, but they strike
different balances between the two. Choosing between the foreseeability and 
efficient risk bearer analyses will therefore depend largely on which of the two
objectives one believes merits greater concern.
Having identified those considerations, the important point to reiterate is
that, whatever normative values one may prioritize, adopting the functionally
superior contractual approach will put tribunals in a better position to pursue
them in the long run.
CONCLUSION
International investment tribunals need a new approach to regulatory
disputes, which will only grow in importance as foreign investors continue to
expand their operations in the global economy and inevitably clash with host
states seeking to regulate the complex problems of modern society. The public
law framework was an improvement over the investor rights approach because
the latter reflected a skewed understanding of the purpose of investment 
treaties. But the public law approach has its own flaws, requiring international
arbitrators to engage in policymaking, a function that, in contrast to domestic 
judges, they lack the expertise and legitimacy to perform. A contractual
approach allows tribunals to focus on the contracting states’ intent rather than
having to independently assess the validity of a host state’s regulation. By 
reframing the inquiry in this way, tribunals can engage in more principled
reasoning and reduce concerns about their legitimacy, and thereby ultimately
better promote the goals of economic cooperation that international investment
law was designed to achieve.
